

## The map that invented Brazil’s territory

**Junia Furtado**

Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais  
([juniaf@ufmg.br](mailto:juniaf@ufmg.br))

### Short Abstract

The objective is to investigate the collaboration established between the Portuguese diplomat Dom Luís da Cunha and the French cartographer D’Anville for the Carte de l’Amérique méridionale (1748) and how it was important to create Brazilian territory after the XVIII century.

### Long Abstract

The objective of this paper is to investigate the collaboration established between the Portuguese diplomat Dom Luís da Cunha and the French cartographer Jean-Baptiste Bourguignon D’Anville for the Carte de l’Amérique méridionale (1748). The map was meant to serve the purposes of the Portuguese court in the negotiations of these boundary-lines between Spanish and Portuguese America that were taking place in Madrid since 1746. The Treaty of Madrid was finally signed in 1750, but D’Anville’s map was not used in the negotiations. Although the Portuguese deliberately hid it, the map was a fundamental key to create the new borders of the Portuguese America, very similar as they are today. In fact, the map invented Brazil’s frontiers and was not a simple mirror of the territory. It reflected Dom Luís da Cunha’s vision with regards to the Portuguese geopolitics that needed to be formulated for the Americas during the first half of the 18th century, and his view reflected in compiling the map. For him, it is important to notice, the establishment of a policy for the area was inseparable from the development of geographic knowledge of the region and he also gave the cartographic documents that the geographer used to draw the Carte de l’Amérique méridionale (1748).

## Negotiation Strategies

It was through the disputes over Portuguese sovereignty over the Amazon and Colônia do Sacramento, as well as his preoccupation with controlling the gold production of Minas Gerais, that D. Luís da Cunha began to articulate some of the future cornerstones of the strategies he believed ought to be adopted in border negotiations with Spain: 1) the use of natural landmarks; 2) respect for previous treaties; and 3) the idea of *uti possidetis*, that is, “giving credit the possessions currently held by each.”<sup>1</sup> We will examine how each of these latter two expedients came to be formed in D. Luís da Cunha’s political thought, as using natural landmarks for this kind of negotiation was hardly a novelty.

In the modern era, defining borders was directly related to the exercise of sovereignty by monarchies.<sup>2</sup> Indeed, in this period, nearly all the crowned heads of “Western Europe launched an intense process of incorporating territories (via inheritance, conquest, or treaty),”<sup>3</sup> making ample use of war (*jus belli*) and pacts (*jus tractum*), negotiated diplomatically (*jus legationis*) to collect territories and expand their borders, on European soil as well as overseas. After the Congress of Utrecht, however, “the temptation to expand borders through war was increasingly curbed by international concerns, as expressed in the theory of the balance of power and recognized for the first time at the Congress.”<sup>4</sup> This emphasis on negotiation as a method of assuring control/sovereignty over territories demanded new legal logics and diplomatic tactics to support nations’ designs in constant scuffles over territories. Throughout his writings, D. Luís da Cunha presented his strategies for guiding and supporting Portuguese demands, invariably with coherence and transparency.

During the 18<sup>th</sup> century, South America was one of the stages for territorial conflicts between European nations, which entailed redefining the borders systematically negotiated in a variety of treaties over the course of the century. For Portugal, and for D. Luís da Cunha in particular, this was not merely a matter of negotiating Brazilian frontiers but of understanding that the territory “functioned as a frontier for Portugal”<sup>5</sup> – that is to say that, bit by bit, Portuguese America was substituting the East as a natural reserve of wealth for the kingdom. This would justify the effort to shift Brazil’s western border farther from the coast, incorporating territories under Portuguese control that, by the terms of previous treaties, belonged to other nations or were considered *terra incognita*, still waiting to be colonized. “Brazil may thus be seen as a frontier society during a considerable period of its history,” during the

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<sup>1</sup> Letter from Tomás da Silva Teles to Marco António de Azevedo Coutinho, September 9, 1747. Apud: CORTESÃO, Jaime. *Alexandre de Gusmão e o Tratado de Madrid*, 1950-1963, part IV, t.1, p.92-93.

<sup>2</sup> CLUNY, Isabel. Os conceitos de soberania, limite e fronteira. In: *D. Luís da Cunha e a ideia de diplomacia em Portugal*, p.99-102.

<sup>3</sup> CARDIM, Pedro. La jurisdicción real y su afirmación en la Corona portuguesa y sus territórios ultramarinos (siglo XVI-XVIII): reflexiones sobre la historiografía. In: PÉREZ, Francisco José Aranda and RODRIGUES, José Damião (eds.). *De Re Publica Hispaniae: una vindicación de la cultura política en los reinos ibéricos en la primera modernidad*. Madrid: Sílex, 2008, p.362.

<sup>4</sup> CLUNY, Isabel. *D. Luís da Cunha e a ideia de diplomacia em Portugal*, p.100.

<sup>5</sup> PEDREIRA, Jorge M. Brasil, fronteira de Portugal. Negócio, emigração e mobilidade social (séculos XVII e XVIII). In: CUNHA, Mafalda Soares da (org.) et alli. *Do Brasil à metrópole: efeitos sociais* (séculos XVII-XVIII). Évora: Universidade de Évora, 2001, p.51.

18<sup>th</sup> century in particular.<sup>6</sup> Over this century, the need to reorganize the territory's frontiers would press the bulk of Portuguese cartographical policy towards America and away from Portugal itself,<sup>7</sup> and all the government's efforts would be turned to mapping Brazil.

### **Respect for Previous Treaties**

The matter of respecting the terms of earlier treaties configured itself in D. Luís da Cunha's thought in terms of the necessity of legitimating possessions that had been historically acquired, even when they went against the demarcations determined by maps, memoirs, posterior occupations, or imaginary lines. Even when one respected maps as reflections of the territory on paper, treaties could not be questioned in the face of imprecise or slippery cartography. And so, in 1721, when he found himself in Paris, with conflicts over the Colônia do Sacramento heating up, and the Spanish tried to prove that the Portuguese claim was illegitimate by the terms of the 1681 Tratado Provisional, D. Luís argued that the Treaty of "Utrecht removes all doubt, as it is posterior, which is true so that when even within the same Treaty two articles are found to be contrary to one another, only the last is valid, because the sides in question should not and may not desire and not desire the same thing at the same time, and so the last disposition ought to be the rule in determining the will of the parties."<sup>8</sup> Similarly, when he was in The Hague in the 1730s, negotiating the rights being disputed between Portugal and the Netherlands for control of trade in Africa, he concluded that "the principle that seems most solid to me is that *of the possession we were accorded after the Treaty of The Hague*,"<sup>9</sup> a truce established between the two powers in 1641. That is to say that once a treaty was established, only another treaty might abolish or override it.

Diplomacy was his specialty; treaty negotiation, his mission. Hence his caution in keeping papers from previous negotiations, relating his principal deeds and preserving them for posterity, as in the *Memórias da Paz de Utrecht*, and in sticking to what had already been agreed as he moved forward in future negotiations. Nonetheless, D. Luís was cognizant of the fact that stronger powers would frequently disrespect the terms they had agreed to, either using the strength of their arms or via the practically silent occupation of a territory not yet colonized by its legal owners.

### ***Uti possidetis***

While history and historical cartography were systematically invoked during the negotiations of disputed territories, it was effective colonization of space that ultimately justified maintaining dominion, and served as an argument that the rival power's rights over the territory were no longer legitimate. De facto *jus* would overrule legal *jus*, that

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<sup>6</sup> PEDREIRA, Jorge M. Brasil, fronteira de Portugal. Negócio, emigração e mobilidade social (séculos XVII e XVIII), p.49. The author emphasizes that this 18<sup>th</sup>-century vision of Brazil as the frontier of the Portuguese empire's expansion is echoed in Turner's theory of the permanently advancing frontier in the United States, during the 19<sup>th</sup> century.

<sup>7</sup> ALEGRIA, Maria Fernanda and GARCIA, João Carlos. Aspectos da evolução da Cartografia portuguesa (séculos XV-XIX), p.71.

<sup>8</sup> ANTT. MNE. Book 793, f.286-287. Paris, June 18, 1724.

<sup>9</sup> ANTT. MNE. Book 795, p.7. (*italics mine*)

is. In 1714, around the time of the Treaty of Utrecht, aware of the method of occupation (*uti possidetis*) as a means of ensuring control, D. Luís da Cunha recalled what had happened when the Company of Scotland received permission to colonize the land on the Gulf of Darién, now situated between Colombia and Panama. At the time, the Scottish had asked that their claim be extended to all the “lands not possessed by any European power – the uninhabited lands,” evidently considering that, as the latter had not been claimed or colonized by any European power, none could claim it. Though the claim was not granted, as it was “not in England’s interest that Scotland should pursue” it, the ambassador recalled the Company’s argument as a warning when it came to Brazil, that it would be “good to arm ourselves with possessory acts for all the still-deserted places that seem ripe for similar establishments.”<sup>10</sup>

The ambassador had given similar advice in 1712, faced with the information that an English expedition led by one Captain Thomas Blau, with the intention of “establishing a new colony, which, though the intended place is unknown, has only to be in the region of Brazil for us to suffer incomparable damage.” He hazarded that “if it were on the islands of Santa Catarina or on the Ilha dos Patos, we would certainly lose great profits from our mines, with the English usurping the better part of that trade.” Once again we see the argument highlighting the transitivity of control over strategic points on the coast, key Portuguese holdings. As a way of preventing this damage, he suggested that “an order to Brazil ought to be sent now, without the slightest hesitation, for a fleet to be sent to Santa Catarina and the Ilha dos Patos with people bringing a few huts,<sup>11</sup> which would be enough to prove that we possess them.” Effective colonization would be the strongest counterargument to legally neutralize a possible English settlement, as “in these terms, the other powers will not fail to help us sustain an *indubitable right*.” And he concluded, “the same ought to be done in all other ports on the coast of Brazil from the **River of the Amazons** to the Río de la Plata, because, this being a preventive measure of very little cost, it frees us of a number of concerns that may alter others’ greed, now being awakened by the wealth of our mines.”<sup>12</sup>

It was with this perspective that the ambassador slowly constructed the idea of *uti possidetis* as an element complementary to, and even stronger than, the terms of previous treaties. This concept came to be articulated more clearly in the ill-fated year of 1736, when his fears of a possible loss of Portuguese hegemony in Brazil would be made concrete. The Colônia do Sacramento was in danger once again, besieged by the Spanish, and the French had invaded Brazilian territory again as well, taking the island of Fernando de Noronha. Another important event that year was the uprising of the Minas backlands against the head tax in the district, which D. Luís must have gotten wind of. Around this time, the use of the concept of *uti possidetis* was still dubious in Portuguese diplomacy.

That same year, D. Luís da Cunha received orders to move to Paris and begin negotiations with France in the hopes of settling with Spain.<sup>13</sup> Franco-Portuguese diplomatic relations, which had been suspended since 1725 due to a diplomatic

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<sup>10</sup> BNP. Reservados. Cod.11.209. Letters from D. Luís da Cunha to Cardinal da Cunha – inquisitor-general, f.435-435v, Utrecht, June 21, 1714.

<sup>11</sup> KUHN, Fábio. Uma fronteira do império: o sul da América portuguesa na primeira metade do século XVIII, *Anais de História de Além-Mar*, v. 8, p.108-113, 2007.

<sup>12</sup> ANTT. MNE. Book 786, f.403. Paris, September 2, 1712.

<sup>13</sup> CORTESÃO, Jaime. *Alexandre de Gusmão e o Tratado de Madrid*, v.3, p.630.

incident,<sup>14</sup> were reestablished in that year, and he was named ambassador. From Paris, he could monitor goings-on around the bay of the Río de la Plata, pressing diplomatic representatives of other nations, principally England, and French authorities to provide military aid or mediate negotiations with the Spanish. He tried to follow the day-to-day of the siege as it came and went, seeing if Spain had taken the Portuguese bastion or if the attack had been repelled. In November, he rejoiced over “the good fortune that His [Portuguese] Majesty’s arms have had America, [and] may God support us until the desired end.”<sup>15</sup> Fully aware that the forces quartered there were insufficient, the ambassador sought military aid, arguing that Portuguese troops from other Brazilian ports should go help in the defense of the fort.<sup>16</sup>

Again, the question of trading territories arose; and D. Luís da Cunha began to speculate about possible bases for the realization of this swap. At the same time, he tried to influence the French ministers to convince the Spanish, as well as rustling up support for the idea at the Portuguese court. Jean-Jacques Amelot de Chaillou, French Minister for Foreign Affairs, had advised him that “any portion of land that Spain gave us in America, would ultimately bring us new hindrances, which was what we ought to carefully and reciprocally attempt to avoid,” and the ambassador would have pressed the point if he knew “what His Majesty might desire in Europe.” To buy himself some time, as he had no orders on the matter, D. Luís was evasive;<sup>17</sup> he said that the issue had been dealt with at Utrecht, but claimed he could not recall what had been agreed.<sup>18</sup> This was one of his strategies to draw things out. Indeed, “a bit of deception” was always necessary to ensure the adequate progression of negotiations; he in fact had an extensive collection of documents describing the Colônia issue in minute detail.<sup>19</sup> Moreover, in 1736 he was working on a defense project that would sum up the Portuguese arguments in favor of their possession of the Colonia do Sacramento, the subject of intense discussions with Alexandre de Gusmão, D. João V’s personal secretary, which would result in a summarizing document to serve as the basis for future negotiations, known as the *Dissertation*.<sup>20</sup> In it, Alexandre de Gusmão summed up his thoughts on the subject, while D. Luís da Cunha, who disagreed with some of his positions, included his observations and corrected the text before it was presented to the French.<sup>21</sup>

One of the points of contention was whether *uti possidetis* would be favorable to Portuguese interests or not. The difficulty came in knowing which territories were possessed by whom, as in wartime situations could evolve quickly and news was slow in arriving. At a given moment, Gusmão could not know if the Portuguese had already

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<sup>14</sup> The break was provoked by a point of protocol; the Abbot of Livry, the French ambassador in Portugal, would only officially present his embassy after being visited at home by Secretary of State Marco António de Azevedo, which the King of Portugal considered an affront.

<sup>15</sup> AUC. Records of D. Luís da Cunha. Doc.387, Report to the Office of the Secretary of State, November 6, 1736.

<sup>16</sup> ANTT. MNE. Book 16, f.20. October 26, 1737.

<sup>17</sup> ANTT. MNE. Book 787. Letters from the Count of Tarouca and D. Luís da Cunha in which the negotiations in Utrecht are related to Diogo de Mendonça Corte Real, 1713, f.52. March 12, 1713.

<sup>18</sup> ANTT. MNE. Box 560. ME.III-A- Fr.C1., n.º.124. Diplomatic documents from France, 1737.

<sup>19</sup> ANTT. MNE. Box 564, doc.356. List of papers found in the office of the Ministry of the Court in Paris.... 1756.

<sup>20</sup> FERREIRA, Mario Clemente. *O Tratado de Madrid e o Brasil Meridional*, p.44.

<sup>21</sup> AUC. CDLC. Doc. 387. Report to the Office of the Secretary of State, November 6, 1736.

taken Montevideo, or if they had founded a settlement at the São Pedro River, as ordered by the King. The court warily recommended to D. Luís, taking its cues from Gusmão, that the best thing would be “that things be restored to the *status quo*, referring back to the time of the last hostilities.” This would be more prudent than allowing affairs to be decided by “*uti possidetis*, as it is unclear what we may have preserved or lost until orders arrive there, as Spain is continuously increasing her strength in those parts.”<sup>22</sup>

After the long debate between the two men, which are translated in the various forms that the *Dissertation* took, Alexandre de Gusmão finally consolidated the Portuguese position into another document known as the *Grande Instrução*, in October 1736.<sup>23</sup> D. Luís da Cunha carefully saved the manuscripts of the document.<sup>24</sup> Among countless other topics, the *Grande Instrução* ordered ambassadors to negotiate for the greatest extension of lands around the Colônia de Sacramento, not seeing it as a bargaining chip with Spain.<sup>25</sup> This was exactly the opposite of D. Luís’ stance by this period.<sup>26</sup> The document also discarded the use of the *uti possidetis* argument on the northern bank of the Río de la Plata, as the ongoing struggle between the Spanish and Portuguese forces in the region made it difficult to foresee who would be controlling what when the negotiations came about. As the results of the conflict were uncertain, it was advised that the idea should only be invoked as a last-ditch negotiation tool. Around this time, however, D. Luís da Cunha already saw *uti possidetis* as a central pillar of his arguments. This position, however, was based on the French invasion of Fernando de Noronha, and not on the Spanish siege of the Colônia do Sacramento. Let us see.

### ***Fernando de Noronha Island***

In November 1736, when the first attempts at negotiating the Colônia with Spain were still dragging on, D. Luís’ darkest predictions seemed on the cusp of coming true. He received a letter from Portugal with “news of the occupation of the island of Fernando de Noronha, [which] was confirmed by word from the viceroy of Bahia, given by one of our fleets that docked there.”<sup>27</sup> Secretary of State Antônio Guedes Pereira said that “the governor of that district” had been informed “that on a neighboring island,

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<sup>22</sup> Cf. CORTESÃO, Jaime. *Alexandre de Gusmão e o Tratado de Madrid*, 1984, v.3, p.627.

<sup>23</sup> “Grande Instrução” redigida por Alexandre de Gusmão e dirigida a dom Luís da Cunha e Marco Antônio de Azevedo Coutinho na qual se propõe uma mudança nas relações diplomáticas de Portugal... Apud: CORTESÃO, Jaime. *Alexandre de Gusmão e o Tratado de Madrid*, part 3, t.1, 1950-1963, p.420-454.

<sup>24</sup> This would be “3 folio volumes entitled Papers which the King sent me on the Colônia do Sacramento, 1<sup>st</sup>, 2<sup>nd</sup>, and 3<sup>rd</sup> parts.” ANTT. MNE. Box 564, doc.356, year 1756.

<sup>25</sup> In the *Grande Instrução*, “the Portuguese diplomat [Alexandre de Gusmão] recalled that the principal aim of the negotiation was not to give up on Sacramento, but to obtain the ‘adjacent territory’ around the Colônia.” FERREIRA, Mario Clemente. *O Tratado de Madrid e o Brasil Meridional*. Lisbon: CNPCDP, 2001, p.45.

<sup>26</sup> ANTT. MNE. Book 793, f.290-291. Letters from D. Luís da Cunha to Portugal, Paris, 1724.

<sup>27</sup> ANTT. MNE. Box 559. M.E. III-A-Fr-C.2, n<sup>o</sup>.5. Portuguese mission in France – dispatches from the year 1736 to the year 1756. Copy of the letter written by Secretary of State Antônio Guedes Pereira to Marco Antônio de Azevedo on November 26, 1736. The letter from the viceroy may be seen in CORTESÃO, Jaime. *Alexandre de Gusmão e o Tratado de Madrid*, part 3, t.1, 1951, p.470-473.

called Fernando de Noronha, some Frenchmen had settled who seemed to be pirates.” The governor gave orders that they be driven out and arrested, which were obeyed. In an enclosed paper, the secretary instructed D. Luís da Cunha to see if he might “find out if the men are in fact pirates, and, following what you find, make the necessary reports at that court.”<sup>28</sup> To this end, the ambassador began feeling out his information networks in Paris and heard from one of his informants in the government<sup>29</sup> that one “Captain Lesquelin, at the order of the (French) India Company, with nine men, had disembarked on the island.”<sup>30</sup>

If first reports were hardly threatening, indicating an invading force of just ten men, the consequences of the action could not be graver; as “given these reports the Company resolved to create on that island, *which it gave the name of Dauphine*, a great and useful establishment.”<sup>31</sup> D. Luís called attention to the fact that, as part of the process of repossession, the French had renamed the island. The act of naming as part of taking possession is present throughout the process of maritime expansion in the modern era, with Europeans renaming geographic features as they became aware of them. “Giving them *legitimate* names (...) equals taking possession.”<sup>32</sup>

The ambassador also took pains to show that, though the first group was small, the Company had resolved to send three hundred more men. It was urgent, then, that “the expedition be hindered, knowing that *once it is accomplished*, all efforts of force or negotiation to frustrate the enterprise will be useless.”<sup>33</sup> Faced with the threat of French colonization, he advises the king that the Portuguese should get to it first and effectively colonize the island themselves. This insistence on populating a given region was directly linked to the idea of later justifying one’s claim over the land by means of the established colony. This was not a case of simply leaving stone markers, raising crosses or claiming the rights of first discovery. The task was to establish a society and an administrative regime, to “internalize the metropolis.”<sup>34</sup>

This notion of territorial rights via colonization appears clearly in D. Luís’ reflections on the invasion at Fernando de Noronha. It would be better for there to be “some sort of settlement there, so that it may not be said that it does not belong to any nation, [as] *it ought to be of the first nation that takes possession of it and preserve it, as it is ours*.” And so he warns that “it is to be feared that once the ships arrive with three hundred more men and more munitions, they may *confirm the possessory act* of the first group.” These two excerpts illustrate the importance of colonization to renew the right of possession obtained by arriving first. The confirmation of the Portuguese claim by discovery or that of the French by conquest would be assured to the nation who effectively colonized the land and created a stable settlement there. This leads him to

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<sup>28</sup> ANTT. MNE. Book 16, f.23v Letter from Secretary of State Antônio Guedes Pereira to Marco Antônio de Azevedo Coutinho, Lisbon, February 22, 1738.

<sup>29</sup> AUC. CDLC. Doc. 408. Report to the Office of the Secretary of State, July 5, 1737. (italics mine)

<sup>30</sup> AUC. CDLC. Doc.408. Report to the Office of the Secretary of State, July 5, 1737.

<sup>31</sup> AUC. CDLC. Doc.408. Report to the Office of the Secretary of State, July 5, 1737.

<sup>32</sup> TODOROV, Tzvetan. *A conquista da América: a questão do outro*. São Paulo: Martins Fontes, 1983, p.27.

<sup>33</sup> AUC. CDLC. Doc.408. Report to the Office of the Secretary of State, July 5, 1737. (italics mine)

<sup>34</sup> DIAS, Maria Odila Leite da Silva. A interiorização da metrópole. In: *A interiorização da metrópole e outros estudos*. São Paulo: Alameda, 2005, p.7-37. FURTADO, Júnia Ferreira. *Homens de negócio*.

affirm that, though it is said that the land “ought to belong to the first [nation] that claims it,” it is “some sort of settlement” that “confirms the possessory act.”<sup>35</sup> For the second time in the ambassador’s thought, we see a clear, if unnamed articulation of the right of *uti possidetis*.

Interestingly enough, D’Anville owned a *Carte Portugaise manuscrite de l’Isle de Fernao de Noronha*, which includes “no. 10 – church and settlement established by the French” on the island. Another map in his collection, by Philippe Buache and entitled *Carte de la partie de l’Ocean vers l’Équateur*, from 1737, where the Fernando de Noronha archipelago is accompanied by the text “island of Fernando de Noronha, named Dauphine in 1734 by a French navigator,”<sup>36</sup> presents a detailed look at the island, and next to the ruin of the old fort one can see a wooden cross planted by the French in 1734. “Naming the island and planting a wooden cross” were integral elements of the ceremonies with which the French established their possessions in the New World.<sup>37</sup> Establishing a landmark, renaming a geographic feature and placing it on the maps of another nation’s territory were also important forms of possession, principally because maps were widely used as repositories of memory in diplomatic negotiations over the historical rights to disputed territories, often claimed by various nations.<sup>38</sup> From this perspective, Dauphine Island was not a simple curiosity or a cartographical aberration. This was a political act, a territorial claim on France’s part, and yet another advance on Portuguese possessions.

Given the Spanish siege of the Colônia do Sacramento and the invasion of Fernando de Noronha Island in 1736, D. Luís da Cunha pressed the Crown to pursue a more active, frankly expansionist policy in the Brazilian South. He then suggested to the king that 1) he “have forces sent from Brazil to the Río de la Plata to take back the fort and attack Buenos Aires, if possible”;<sup>39</sup> 2) “build the planned fort at Montevideo, as [...] if an equivalent should be proposed in Europe, the more we have to give up, the better”;<sup>40</sup> 3) populate this fort while “shielded by men and ships from Bahia and Rio de Janeiro”;<sup>41</sup> and 4) fortify and populate islands such as, for example, Santa Catarina.<sup>42</sup>

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<sup>35</sup> AUC. Records of D. Luís da Cunha. Doc.408. Report to the Office of the Secretary of State, July 5, 1737. (italics mine)

<sup>36</sup> *Isle de Fernand de Noronha nomée I. Dauphine en 1734 par un navigateur[navigateur] ok François*. BNF. DCP. Ge DD 2987 (9523).

<sup>37</sup> SEED, Patrícia. Cerimônias: os teatrais ritos franceses de tomada de posse política. In: *Cerimônias de posse na conquista européia do Novo Mundo* (1492-1640). São Paulo: Unesp, 1999, p.63-99.

<sup>38</sup> A *Carte Portugaise manuscrite de l’Isle de Fernao de Noronha*, belonging to the collection, catalogued as BNF. DCP. Ge DD 2987 (9525).

<sup>39</sup> AUC. Records of D. Luís da Cunha. Doc.342, report to the Office of the Secretary of State, July 20, 1736.

<sup>40</sup> AUC. Records of D. Luís da Cunha. Doc.359, report to the Office of the Secretary of State, August 17, 1736.

<sup>41</sup> AUC. Records of D. Luís da Cunha. Doc.346, report to the Office of the Secretary of State, August 24, 1736.

<sup>42</sup> AUC. Records of D. Luís da Cunha. Doc.408, report to the Office of the Secretary of State, July 5, 1737.

These positions differ starkly from those taken in 1720-21, when he feared that any Portuguese action might provoke further Spanish retaliations.<sup>43</sup>

In recommending the fortification of the coast and the inauguration of an aggressive policy of protecting Portuguese territory, the ambassador left no doubt that, in his eyes, “the concept of *frontier* was directly connected to the defense of the king’s territory and sovereignty, against foreign powers.”<sup>44</sup> Interestingly enough, and in what does not appear to be a mere coincidence, the next year – 1737 – would see the Portuguese government’s initiating the population and colonization of the São Pedro region, with the construction of several forts.

### **The Dissertation**

Collecting his reflections on the Colônia do Sacramento and Fernando de Noronha Island in late 1736, in his text D. Luís da Cunha would clearly articulate the concept of *uti possidetis*, which would appear first in his correspondence and then in the *Dissertation* he was drawing up with Gusmão. Among other measures to maintain control of strategic areas, he wrote to the king suggesting that a fort be built at Montevideo, populating it while “shielded by men and ships from Bahia and Rio de Janeiro, as it is easier to work when one goes on the basis of *uti possidetis* than by another tack.” Moreover, “A fortification of earth can speedily be built, and if the garrison is strong, it can be defended with good artillery.”<sup>45</sup>

As we have seen, at first Alexandre de Gusmão – and the government, by extension – feared the wholesale adoption of the concept of *uti possidetis* to resolve their disputes with Spain around the Río de la Plata. Slowly, however, and at the ambassador’s insistence, this concept would be reconfigured as the crux of the negotiations, coming to fruition in Madrid in 1750. Inspired by D. Luís da Cunha, “in the conferences preceding the signing of the Treaty [of Madrid] it was resolved that the establishment of imaginary lines of demarcation be entirely ceased.” That is, previous agreements would no longer be valid, and new boundary lines would be determined according to the two principles for which he had fought: that frontiers “be decided by the most notable and well-known rivers and mountains” – natural borders – and that “each of the contracting parties [remain] with what it possessed on that date” – *uti possidetis* – “with the exception of such mutual concessions as may be made.”<sup>46</sup>

The *Carte de l’Amérique méridionale* by D’Anville clearly mirrors these concepts. Blank areas on the map represent uninhabited areas. They, albeit uncolonized, could belong to one of the two nations, being circumscribed by their new frontiers. The dividing line drawn by the geographer respects natural landmarks, such as is seen with Lake Xarais, as well as effective colonization of the territory. And it clearly marks – as in the case of the Colônia do Sacramento – the territories that might be exchanged

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<sup>43</sup> ALMEIDA, André Ferrand de. *A formação do espaço brasileiro e o projecto do Novo Atlas da América Portuguesa*, p.70-71.

<sup>44</sup> CLUNY, Isabel. *D. Luís da Cunha e a idéia de diplomacia em Portugal*, p.122.

<sup>45</sup> AUC. Records of D. Luís da Cunha. Doc.346, report to the Office of the Secretary of State, August 24, 1736. This part of the document may be seen in: SILVA, Abílio Diniz. Introduction, p.114.

<sup>46</sup> RIO-BRANCO, José Maria da Silva Paranhos Júnior (Baron of). *Questão de limites*. Rio de Janeiro: Ministério das Relações Exteriores, 1845-1847, v.1, p.21. (italics mine)

between the two Crowns. In this sense, it was an evident expression of the policies that D. Luís supported for border negotiations in America.

### Negotiations in Madrid

Starting in mid-1746, with the July 9<sup>th</sup> death of Philip V – who had been pro-French and openly averse to coming to terms with Portugal – the Portuguese crown struck up efforts to reestablish negotiations with Spain on more promising terms. This rapprochement was the culmination of the Portuguese diplomatic strategy begun in 1727-28, with the double marriage between the crown princes and princesses of the two reigning houses. The negotiation involved marrying the Spanish Infanta, Mariana Victoria, to D. José, heir to the Portuguese throne, and the marrying Portuguese princess D. Maria Bárbara to Fernando, heir to the Spanish throne.<sup>47</sup> This strategy sought to create a climate that might be friendlier for Portugal.<sup>48</sup> When he heard of the death of the Spanish monarch and Fernando VI's ascension, D. João V wrote a letter to his daughter – the new queen – asking that filial love drive her to collaborate with the rapprochement and the continuation of negotiations between the countries.<sup>49</sup> From then on, the situation evolved rapidly. In September 1746, shortly after Fernando VI's ascension to the throne, the Viscount of Vila Nova de Cerveira left for Madrid to take on the post of ambassador.<sup>50</sup>

The coronation brought changes to the Spanish court. The Marquis de la Ensenada was named secretary of state; the next year saw D. José de Carvajal's naming as secretary of foreign affairs. A learned man, Ensenada served successively as Secretary of the Treasury, Navy, War, the Indies, and then Secretary of State. With D. Maria Bárbara's support, he would be named personal secretary in 1747. José de Carvajal, also supported by the queen, was a friend of Vila Nova de Cerveira's, and his nomination was designed to favor negotiations with Portugal. Spanish policy over the next years, would take an ambiguous tack, however, leaning first towards France and then England (complicated by the English refusal to give up Gibraltar). As for the matters to be resolved with Portugal, especially on American soil, there still had been no decision as to whether they would be negotiated separately or as part of the alliances that Spain would be discussing at Breda (1747) and Aachen (1748).

Shortly after arriving, Cerveira struck up the first negotiations; and, on November 12<sup>th</sup>, 1746, he wrote to the Secretary of State in Portugal, Marco Antônio de Azevedo Coutinho, reporting on his first meeting with the Marquis de la Ensenada. In this first discussion, the two spoke of “the possibility of resolving the disputes over the

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<sup>47</sup> FUERTES, Amália Yrizar. *Tiempo de bodas: Tratados matrimoniales entre las dinastías ibéricas (1727-1728)*. In: ALBUQUERQUE, Martim de; GUERREIRO, Inácio; PORTELA, Feliciano Novoa; CASTELLANOS, Elena Postigo (orgs.). *Encontros e desencontros ibéricos: Tratados hispano-portugueses desde a Idade Média*. Lisbon: Chaves Ferreira, 2006, p.171-185.

<sup>48</sup> FUERTES, Amália Yrizar. *Tiempo de bodas: Tratados matrimoniales entre las dinastías ibéricas (1727-1728)*, p.163-164.

<sup>49</sup> AUC. CDLC. Doc.884, report from Marco Antônio de Azevedo to D. Luís da Cunha, Lisbon, July 30, 1746, f.1. (italics in the original)

<sup>50</sup> AUC. CDLC. Doc.894. Lisbon, September 1746; and Letter from august 14, 1746. Apud: MONTEIRO, Nuno Gonçalo (org.). *Meu pai e meu senhor muito do meu coração: correspondência do conde de Assumar, para seu pai, o marquês de Alorna*, p.70.

Colônia do Sacramento and trade relations between the two countries,” thus beginning a long negotiation that would be drawn out over the coming years.<sup>51</sup>

This moment saw the start of an intense exchange of information between Vila Nova de Cerveira, in Madrid, the court in Lisbon (Marco Antônio de Azevedo and Alexandre de Gusmão in particular) and D. Luís da Cunha in Paris, all in the service of orchestrating their actions and getting the negotiations going.<sup>52</sup> From then on, occupying the role of oracle to the king and following D. João V’s orders, the old ambassador tried to make clear what he thought ought to be done. Vila Nova de Cerveira, meanwhile, asked him to draw up “minute instructions as to make me able to understand Portugal’s true interests at present.” The old ambassador’s opinion was so important that the marquis pleaded to be informed of his decisions and asked him to “send a general plan of peace, as you understand that it should be, attending both to the present state and what the future may have in store,”<sup>53</sup> considering him “a perennial font of solid, clear, secure counsel (...) *as an oracle in all matters.*”<sup>54</sup>

Though far from the center of the negotiations, as his advanced age and poor health counseled against a move to Madrid, D. Luís played an important role from Paris, articulating the French support for Portuguese claims. He took advantage of the fact that the traditional Franco-Spanish alliance was weakened, which was even being recognized at the Spanish court. The ascension of new ministers of state in France after Cardinal Fleury’s death in 1743 – particularly the Count D’Argenson,<sup>55</sup> Secretary of State and War; Marquis D’Argenson,<sup>56</sup> Secretary of Foreign Affairs; Bishop Chavigny<sup>57</sup> and the Count de Maurepas,<sup>58</sup> all allies of the House of Orléans and opposed to Bourbon Spanish interests – paved the way for a Franco-Portuguese alliance,<sup>59</sup> given D. Luís’ historical support of the Orléans. He and Marco Antônio de Azevedo considered themselves friends of Chavigny, and both believed that the bishop would play a key role in ensuring French support during the negotiations with Spain.<sup>60</sup>

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<sup>51</sup> CORTESÃO, Jaime. *Alexandre de Gusmão e o Tratado de Madrid*, 1950-1963, part IV, t.I, p.23-26.

<sup>52</sup> The intensity of this exchange may be seen in the significant and copious collection of letters compiled by Jaime de Cortesão, which comprises part IV, *Negociações*, of his work. CORTESÃO, Jaime. *Alexandre de Gusmão e o Tratado de Madrid*, 1950-1963, part IV, t.1 and t.2.

<sup>53</sup> AUC. CDLC. Doc.894. Letter from Tomás da Silva Teles to D. Luís, September 3, 1746, p.1-1v.

<sup>54</sup> AUC. CDLC. Doc.894, p.1-1v. (*italics mine*)

<sup>55</sup> The Marquis D’Argenson, not to be confused with the count. The count D’Argenson at the time was Marc-Pierre de Voyer de Paulmy, who had served as chancellor to the Duke of Orléans (1723-1740), then as minister of state (1742) and secretary of state and of war (1742-1757).

<sup>56</sup> René-Louis de Voyer d’Argenson, author of the famous diaries chronicling the court of Louis XV. D’ARGENSON. *Journal et mémoires du marquis d’Argenson*.

<sup>57</sup> Denis-François Bouthilier de Chavigny, bishop and son of Léon de Bouthilier, count of Chavigny, who had been minister of foreign affairs. Both father and son were tied to the House of Orléans.

<sup>58</sup> Jean-Frédéric Phélypeaux, count of Maurepas, was secretary of the navy and used men of science, especially those in the Académie des Sciences de Paris, in order to develop nautical knowledge in the service of the French navy.

<sup>59</sup> The dispute between the two houses would grow fiercer during the War of Spanish Succession, when Louis d’Orléans vied with the Bourbon Philip V for the throne of Spain and was slighted in favor of the second, as was confirmed in Utrecht in 1713.

<sup>60</sup> AUC. CDLC. Doc.884, Report from Marco Antônio de Azevedo to D. Luís da Cunha, Lisbon, July 30, 1746, f.3.)

Chavigny had served as the French ambassador in Lisbon since 1739, establishing strong ties to the country in the process. The old ambassador's contact with the Orléans also included his friendship with D'Anville, another faithful servant of the house, and with the Marquis D'Argenson, whom he had known since the man's 1737 nomination as French ambassador to Portugal, though he never wound up serving.<sup>61</sup> The Marquis D'Argenson and Chavigny were frequent guests at D. Luís da Cunha's table, and now he set about fostering opinions favorable to Portugal. D. Luís drew up text after text in French for their benefit, defending the Portuguese position and contesting Spanish claims. As diplomatic activity included a healthy dose of espionage, he also sounded out French authorities he knew as to their positions on the disputes with Spain.<sup>62</sup>

#### D. Luís and the Maps of Brazil

When, in early 1736, Vila Nova de Cerveira began to organize the first conversations with Spanish officials to start negotiations between the two countries, he saw that the instructions he had been given upon leaving Lisbon were insufficient, especially regarding the Colônia do Sacramento;<sup>63</sup> and new ones were slow to arrive.<sup>64</sup> The first truly detailed document he received on the subject came to him from the very Marquis de la Ensenada, to whom he had complained about the lack of detailed knowledge during the last set of negotiations. With the Spanish report in hand, he noted that the document was accompanied by a map and presented only a partial description of events, justifying only Spanish interests and claims in the dispute.<sup>65</sup> He then began to press for more precise orders from Portugal, pleading that "with all possible speed, send all that you believe may instruct me, not because I believe these matters are being dealt with, but so that I may know how to respond if they ask me."<sup>66</sup>

Around the same time, D. Luís da Cunha began a profitable new push to write texts on the matter. He was fulfilling the role of an Enlightenment *savant* – becoming the counselor and mirror for his prince, an oracle on the theater of the world. This was in large part the task of compiling all the documentation he had been collecting on the subject throughout his life and organizing it in accordance with his vision,<sup>67</sup> as he sought to shape a living memory of everything negotiated by the Portuguese over the first half of the century. Though he would write to his nephew that he was exhausted from drawing up so many reports,<sup>68</sup> he was enormously pleased to attend the king's wishes and serve as counselor, pulling the strings of the negotiation from across Europe.

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<sup>61</sup> D'ARGENSON. *Journal et mémoires du marquis d'Argenson*, tome 1, p.248.

<sup>62</sup> AUC. CDLC. Report from D. Luís to the Office of the Secretary of State, doc.794, April 11, 1746.

<sup>63</sup> Letter from September 1746. Apud: CORTESÃO, Jaime. *Alexandre de Gusmão e o Tratado de Madrid*, 1950-1963, part IV, tome I, p.19-20.

<sup>64</sup> Letter from September 23, 1746. Apud: CORTESÃO, Jaime. *Alexandre de Gusmão e o Tratado de Madrid*, 1950-1963, part IV, tome I, p.21-22.

<sup>65</sup> Letter from November 28, 1728. Apud: CORTESÃO, Jaime. *Alexandre de Gusmão e o Tratado de Madrid*, 1950-1963, part IV, tome I, p.31-32.

<sup>66</sup> Letter from November 28, 1728. Apud: CORTESÃO, Jaime. *Alexandre de Gusmão e o Tratado de Madrid*, 1953, part IV, tome I, p.32.

<sup>67</sup> ANTT. MNE. Box 564. Doc.356, year 1756.

<sup>68</sup> AUC. CDLC. Doc.836. Report from D. Luís da Cunha to D. Luís da Cunha Manoel ok, May 23, 1746.

In addition to providing counsel, the old ambassador understood that he could also contribute from the cartographical side. He had argued since the Treaty of Utrecht that maps ought to guide border negotiations between nations; and he had been collaborating with D’Anville since 1724. The latter, at his request, had begun working to map America in 1737, steadily improving his knowledge of the continent’s geography since then. D. Luís’ interest in contributing to the production of maps of Brazil was fed by pleas from the Viscount of Vila Nova de Cerveira, who was equally aware that maps could be an important weapon in these negotiations, and that the delegation ought to arm themselves with cartographical documentation in support of Portuguese claims. From his very first meetings with Carvajal, the minister had assured him “that he had maps, reports, and documents, proving that the mines of Cuiabá were in the Spanish demarcation, and that near the Maranhão River a portion of land that was Spain’s by right had been usurped.”<sup>69</sup>

D. Luís da Cunha, who was also receiving copies of these letters, promised Cerveira that he would send him a map detailing the Portuguese position and La Condamine’s account of the Amazon,<sup>70</sup> as well as another map by D’Anville of the Jesuit missions in Paraguay. This was the *Carte du Paraguay*, which the geographer had published in the *Recueil des Lettres édifiantes* in 1733.<sup>71</sup> D. Luís then promised “two long discourses on the dividing line,” drawn up at his request by D’Anville in 1737.<sup>72</sup> Cerveira was aware of the content of these discourses, as in July 1747 he mentioned to Carvajal that “in the opinion of modern geographers,” the Moluccas, the Philippines, and the Mariana Islands would all fall in the Portuguese section – precisely the position expressed by D’Anville in said papers.<sup>73</sup> The viscount also received maps; satisfied, he declared in February 1747 that he was in possession of “two of the best maps there are, which may help us to regulate the limits of our domains,”<sup>74</sup> but by the next month he complained that the first map promised to him by D. Luís had yet to arrive.<sup>75</sup> This was “a small map to verify your favorable opinion,” which D’Anville was working on “of late,” at his request.<sup>76</sup>

Night was falling on August 18<sup>th</sup>, 1747, as a hurried traveler approached the gates of the city of Madrid.<sup>77</sup> He was dusty and exhausted after nearly ten days of swift

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<sup>69</sup> Letter from February 6, 1747. Apud: CORTESÃO, Jaime. *Alexandre de Gusmão e o Tratado de Madrid*, 1950-1963, part IV, tome I, p.75.

<sup>70</sup> Letter from March 25, 1747. Apud: CORTESÃO, Jaime. *Alexandre de Gusmão e o Tratado de Madrid*, 1950-1963, part IV, tome I, p.85.

<sup>71</sup> BNF. GD 2836. *Le Paraguai*, 1733, D’Anville. ANVILLE, Jean-Baptiste Bourguignon d’. *Observations géographiques sur la carte du Paraguai*. In: *Lettres édifiantes et curieuses, écrites des missions étrangères*. [1733] Toulouse: Noel-Etienne Sens/Auguste Gaude, 1810-1811, v.8, p.254-266.

<sup>72</sup> Letter from August 17, 1747. Apud: CORTESÃO, Jaime. *Alexandre de Gusmão e o Tratado de Madrid*, 1950-1963, part IV, tome I, p.98.

<sup>73</sup> Letter from July 9, 1747. Apud: CORTESÃO, Jaime. *Alexandre de Gusmão e o Tratado de Madrid*, 1950-1963, part IV, tome I, p.93.

<sup>74</sup> CORTESÃO, Jaime. *Alexandre de Gusmão e o Tratado de Madrid*, 1950-1963, part IV, tome I, p.81.

<sup>75</sup> Letter from March 25, 1747. Apud: CORTESÃO, Jaime. *Alexandre de Gusmão e o Tratado de Madrid*, 1950-1963, part IV, tome I, p.85.

<sup>76</sup> Letter from August 17, 1747. Apud: CORTESÃO, Jaime. *Alexandre de Gusmão e o Tratado de Madrid*, 1950-1963, part IV, tome I, p.98.

<sup>77</sup> AUC. CDLC. Doc. 994, f.1, Madrid, August 21, 1747.

journey from Paris, where he served D. Luís da Cunha at the time.<sup>78</sup> The cities of Blois, Poitiers, Bordeaux, and Bayonne – on French soil – and Vitoria, Miranda de Ebro, Burgos, Aranda de Duero, Boceguillas, and Alcobendas<sup>79</sup> – in Spain, only served for brief respites, enough to rest the aching body wearied by the day’s journey, change the horses or let them rest, and find some sustenance – only enough to recover the energy spent on the trip. But the pain was already part of his day-to-day, common to all those tasked with bearing correspondence swiftly and securely between the Portuguese ambassadors spread across Europe as well as between them and officials back in Portugal. His duty was to deliver the ambassador’s correspondence as swiftly as possible, though there were those who compared him to a turtle.<sup>80</sup>

Once inside the city, the *correio*<sup>81</sup> moved quickly, as the serpentine streets and narrow alleys, still warm from the heat of the day, were more than familiar. He went without delay to the house of Vila Nova de Cerveira<sup>82</sup> and knocked at the door. Despite the late hour, Cerveira was not in. The precious order was thus handed over to the diplomat’s servants,<sup>83</sup> and the viscount was immediately advised of the arrival of news from Paris.<sup>84</sup> Along with D. Luís’ letters was a manuscript map of South America,<sup>85</sup> accompanied by an explanatory letter, both by Jean-Baptiste Bourguignon D’Anville, geographer to the King of France.<sup>86</sup> This was a smaller copy of the *Carte de l’Amérique méridionale*, which would be printed the next year. Lacking for quality maps and unable to find them in Madrid, Cerveira recommended to D. João V that the geographer be royally compensated, a suggestion echoed by D. Luís.<sup>87</sup>

D. Luís knew of the “difficulty of regulating the borders of America.” For this reason, he argued that after the terms were settled, a demarcating commission should be named, for “expert persons” to conduct “an examination [...] of the places.” But this would not be possible, he wrote, “without a map in the format indicated by Mr.

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<sup>78</sup> That was the average time that the Portuguese post took, at the time, to cover the nearly 1,300 kilometers separating Paris from Madrid. Cf. AUC. CDLC. Doc. 1017, Escorial, October 30, 1747. With fair weather and good roads (especially between May and October), the trip could be made by a fast *correio* (messenger) in five to seven days. In the winter, it might take as long as 15 days. Found at Arquivo da Universidade de Coimbra, Coimbra. OZANAN, Didier. *La diplomacia de Fernando VI: correspondencia reservada entre D. Jose de Carvajal y el Duque de Huescar, 1746-1749*. Madrid: Escuela de Historia Moderna, 1975, p.80.

<sup>79</sup> Paris. AAE. Political Correspondence II. Book 501. Viagem da Infanta dona Luiza de Madrid a Versailles. Espagne.

<sup>80</sup> According to the Count of Huescar, D. Luís’ messengers moved like turtles. Letter from Versailles, February 20, 1747. *Apud*: OZANAN, Didier. *La diplomacia de Fernando VI*, p.150.

<sup>81</sup> Letter from his nephew, D. Luís da Cunha Manoel, from February 23, 1750. *Apud*: CLUNY, Isabel. *D. Luís da Cunha e a idéia de diplomacia em Portugal*. Lisbon: Livros Horizontes, 1999, p.234. ANTT. MNE. Box 2, bundle 2. Doc.117, Paris, November 28, 1746.

<sup>82</sup> AUC. CDLC. Doc. 894, Lisbon, September 1746.

<sup>83</sup> Letter from the Count of Assumar, March 20, 1746. *Apud*: MONTEIRO. *Meu pai e meu senhor muito do meu coração*, p.58.

<sup>84</sup> AUC. CDLC. Doc. 994, f.1, Madrid, August 21, 1747.

<sup>85</sup> AUC. CDLC. Doc. 994, f.1, Madrid, August 21, 1747.

<sup>86</sup> DE MANNE, J.C.J. and DU BOCAGE, Jean-Denis Barbié. *Notice des Ouvrages de M. D’Anville précédée de son éloge*, frontispiece.

<sup>87</sup> CORTESÃO, Jaime. *Alexandre de Gusmão e o Tratado de Madrid*. Rio de Janeiro: Ministério das Relações Exteriores, 1950-1963, part IV, tome I, p.100.

D’Anville,”<sup>88</sup> as he believed this to be the most perfect reflection of the Brazilian territory produced to date. The Portuguese government was aware of the precision achieved in D’Anville’s map. For this reason, although D. Luís sent a smaller copy to the Viscount of Vila Nova de Cerveira,<sup>89</sup> the document was not presented to the Spanish. The order to this effect came from Portugal, straight from the quill of Alexandre de Gusmão. A new map was being drawn up in Portugal and would soon be sent to the ambassador in Madrid, establishing the negotiations along other terms.

#### ***D. Luís da Cunha versus Alexandre de Gusmão***

Despite all of D. Luís da Cunha’s efforts, his death in November 1749 kept him from taking part in the last negotiations over territorial disputes in America, which would finally be resolved in Madrid the following year. Though he was involved in preliminary talks from Paris, it was Alexandre de Gusmão who ultimately stood out as the great craftsman of the border negotiations, with Vila Nova de Cerveira as his negotiator.<sup>90</sup> According to Isabel de Cluny, his actions, “developed in negotiation, aimed at ending problems in Brazil and in the Río de la Plata region, were based on the proposals suggested by D. Luís da Cunha.”<sup>91</sup> However, though Alexandre de Gusmão had put into practice all the principal ideas proposed by the old ambassador, their geopolitical visions and strategies for border negotiations varied in several aspects, albeit converging in the final text.

Throughout the whole of his correspondence, D. Luís da Cunha was not shy about expressing his opinion as to how to conduct border negotiations. Firstly, he believed that the new meridian measurements placed the Colônia do Sacramento outside the Portuguese territory established by the Treaty of Tordesillas, as well as much of the mining region (the Brazilian Midwest) and Amazonia. This conviction was largely based on the two memoirs on Tordesillas drawn up by D’Anville at his request.<sup>92</sup> This assertion implied, as a second point, that negotiations ought to be carried out on the basis of what had been settled in previous diplomatic agreements, as the Tratado Provisional and the Treaty of Utrecht clearly gave Portugal control over the Colônia do Sacramento.<sup>93</sup> But maintaining this territory was costly for the Portuguese, and no economic interest justified its expense;<sup>94</sup> and so, given the growing importance of the mining region, he argued – thirdly – that Sacramento should be traded for more valuable possessions elsewhere.

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<sup>88</sup> AUC. CDLC. Doc.1017. Letter from Tomás da Silva Teles, viscount of Vila Nova de Cerveira and Portuguese ambassador in Madrid, to D. Luís, Escorial, October 30, 1747.

<sup>89</sup> AUC. CDLC. Doc. 994, f.1. Madrid, August 21, 1747.

<sup>90</sup> CORTESÃO, Jaime. *Alexandre de Gusmão e o Tratado de Madrid*, 1950-1963, 10 vols.

<sup>91</sup> CLUNY, Isabel. *D. Luís da Cunha e a idéia de diplomacia em Portugal*, p.221.

<sup>92</sup> NL. Vault box. Ayer MS 1918. D’ANVILLE, Jean-Baptiste Bourguignon. Two autograph manuscripts concerning the papal line of demarcation between Spain and Portugal in South America, giving a detailed account of the dispute between the 2 countries... [manuscript] 1734-1746.

<sup>93</sup> ANTT. MNE. Book 793. Letters from D. Luís to Portugal, Paris, 1724, f.284-292.

<sup>94</sup> ANTT. MNE. Book 789. Letters from D. Luís to Portugal, Madrid, 1719-1720. Brief Report for sr. Antonio Guedes Pereira, f.645. ANTT. MNE. Book 793. Letters from D. Luís da Cunha to Portugal, Paris, 1724, f.291.

As a fourth point, D. Luís was increasingly sure that the borders between Portugal and Spanish territories in America ought to be negotiated as a whole, not limited to the tip of the Brazilian South. The Colônia do Sacramento and the Moluccas would be the principal bargaining chips, and new borders ought to be guided by natural landmarks and *uti possidetis* – that is to say that each government would be accorded the lands it had colonized in practice. As a fifth point D. Luís argued that maps, made as accurate as possible, should guide these negotiations and serve as reflections of the territories in question. After the signing of a definitive treaty, marks ought to be set to establish the new frontiers; and the American territories ought to be mapped, establishing the line of demarcation beyond a shadow of a doubt. The old ambassador's seniority over Alexandre de Gusmão, however, was not enough to prevent negotiations with Spain from diverging from these points.

These differences were already taking shape by the time of the *Dissertation*, but became evident in the construction of the arguments and maps preceding the diplomatic agreement in Madrid in 1750. Despite D. Luís' insistence, Gusmão sought to bear witness to the impossibility of knowing the real position of the Tordesillas Meridian, though he was aware of Delisle's estimates and knew that precise measurements had been taken in Brazil.<sup>95</sup> Their opinions also differed when it came to trading the Colônia do Sacramento. Gusmão would only venture to propose trading it for an equivalent in September of 1748, but he did so while insisting that the territory in question be in Europe, not America. This was not, then, a means for trading territories between the two governments in America, nor an effort to deal with American borders as a whole and thus guarantee Portuguese possession of large swathes of land in Amazonia, say, or in the Midwest.<sup>96</sup> Though Gusmão changed his tune around this period, he remained skeptical as to the possibility of finding a mutually satisfactory equivalent.

The idea of a trade would make ripples in Portugal, however, and the issue would be more seriously discussed at the court, including by Gusmão himself. Royal orders on November 22<sup>nd</sup>, 1748 finally decreed that the Colônia would be ceded.<sup>97</sup> But by May of the next year, given the slow pace of negotiations with Spain, Gusmão would ask Cerveira, “what is, then, the equivalent offered by His Majesty for the territory and the Colônia?” With a mixture of irritation with and distrust of the proposal, he challenged the viscount to “cast your eyes on the map and you will easily see that we can ask for nothing that is not too costly for Spain or of graver consequences, than what we have proposed.”<sup>98</sup> But the course of the negotiations would lead the Portuguese to give up the Colônia do Sacramento after all; it became an important bargaining chip, as D. Luís da Cunha had been proposing for so many years. In January 1750, not without significant repercussions, it was turned over to the Spanish in the agreement signed at Madrid.

Despite Alexandre de Gusmão's initial divergences, the 1750 Treaty of Madrid, principally due to the efforts of the Portuguese, would enshrine most of the proposals supported by D. Luís da Cunha. The matter was not limited to the Colônia do Sacramento, nor even to America – it included the Moluccas in the South Sea (or Pacific Ocean) as bargaining chips offered in exchange for territories in the Brazilian

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<sup>95</sup> CORTESÃO, Jaime. *Alexandre de Gusmão e o Tratado de Madrid*, v.3, p.602.

<sup>96</sup> ANTT. MNE. Box 612, September 11, 1748.

<sup>97</sup> FERREIRA, Mario Clemente. *O Tratado de Madrid e o Brasil Meridional*, p.47.

<sup>98</sup> ANTT. MNE. Box 612, May 16, 1749.

Midwest and the Amazon region, in the latter case guaranteeing Portuguese hegemony over both banks of the river along its entire course. No equivalent on European soil would be offered. Territorial adjustments would be driven by the principle of *uti possidetis*, guided whenever possible by natural landmarks; this meant that the whole of the American *sertão* remained under Portuguese control. Nevertheless, Alexandre de Gusmão differed from D. Luís da Cunha on one crucial point. This divergence would take form, as we shall see, in the different ways in which the two went about constructing cartographical knowledge of Portuguese America at the dawn of the 1750 negotiations.

## A War of Images on the Eve of the Treaty of Madrid

### Diplomacy and Cartography

In the years leading up to the signing of the Treaty of Madrid, maps came and went between Lisbon, Madrid, and Paris, “for information as to the borders indicated in the Plan” drawn up to resolve the issues at hand.<sup>99</sup> Cartography’s importance meant that it was constantly invoked during this process. While maps revealed the territories that could be exchanged in America, or revealed the impossibility of trading them, they also served to illustrate where the line of demarcation ought to go. For this reason, each government set about “draw[ing] with a red line” or a line of another color, “or fixing a few silk threads”<sup>100</sup> on the map to demarcate their territorial claims.<sup>101</sup> Maps, such as La Condamine’s of Amazonia,<sup>102</sup> the map by Diogo Soares, one of the priest-mathematicians, representing the São Pedro River and Curitiba, and D’Anville’s map of Paraguay were among the many collected by the Portuguese and presented to the Spanish to facilitate the negotiation process.<sup>103</sup> Others were intentionally hidden or only used partially by the Portuguese, as was the case with D’Anville’s *Carte de l’Amérique méridionale* or the *Descrição do Continente da América Meridional*, produced in Brazil at the orders of Viceroy Gomes Freire de Andrade.<sup>104</sup>

In 1747, when D. Luís sent the *Carte de l’Amérique méridionale* to Cerveira in Madrid, the latter was not completely polished, but came in the form of “a small map to verify your favorable opinion.”<sup>105</sup> Jaime Cortesão believed this to be a manuscript map

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<sup>99</sup> ANTT. MNE. Box 612. Letter from Marco Antônio de Azevedo to Vila Nova de Cerveira, February 8, 1749.

<sup>100</sup> Letter from April 2, 1749. Apud: CORTESÃO, Jaime. *Alexandre de Gusmão e o Tratado de Madrid*, part IV, tome I, p.279.

<sup>101</sup> ANTT. MNE. Box 612. Letter from Marco Antônio de Azevedo to Vila Nova de Cerveira, Lisbon, February 8, 1749.

<sup>102</sup> ANTT. MNE. Box 612. Letter from Marco Antônio de Azevedo to Vila Nova de Cerveira, Lisbon, May 16, 1749.

<sup>103</sup> ANTT. MNE. Book 826. Letter from Marco Antônio de Azevedo to Vila Nova de Cerveira, f.112-113, Lisbon, December 14, 1748.

<sup>104</sup> *Descrição do continente da América Meridional que nos pertence com os rios, e montes, que os certanejos mais experimentados, dizem ter encontrado, cuja divisão se faz.*

<sup>105</sup> ANTT. MNE. Book 826. Letter from Vila Nova de Cerveira to Marco Antônio de Azevedo, f.16-16v, Madrid, August 17, 1747.

dated 1742, a photocopy of which he found in the Arquivo do Itamaraty.<sup>106</sup> The D’Anville collection also has a map entitled *Carte de l’Amérique méridionale*, a very similar document to the one he produced for the Duke of Chartres in 1737, but lacking a dedication and a date. It takes up only one page, with greatly reduced dimensions compared to the 1748 printed versions. The map is just 47 by 34.5 centimeters, corresponding perfectly to the small map Cerveira describes. Might it have been drawn up in 1742, sent to Madrid in 1747, and referenced by Cortesão? While the probable date for the map cannot be dismissed, it can be said with relative certainty that this is not the copy sent to back up negotiations in Madrid, as the geopolitical vision D. Luís supported for Brazil no longer fit with this configuration. This becomes evident around the region of the Colônia do Sacramento, which is represented as contiguous with the Brazilian territory in the first version and separated in the second, favoring the ambassador’s later policy of territory-swapping. Differences are also clear in the Amazon; the 1742 version limits Portuguese sovereignty to the bottom region of the river, around Belém, respecting the Tordesillas Meridian. The 1748 printed map hews much more closely to the ambassador’s positions around the time, and, while we cannot locate the copy sent to Madrid, we may be sure that it was very similar to the final manuscript version of the *Carte de l’Amérique méridionale*.<sup>107</sup> The latter does not represent the Jauru River, branching off the upper stretch of the Paraguay, known in Lisbon since 1743, but which D. Luís did not have precise information on. In the *Instruções Políticas*, he argued that “an adequate border on land might be the Paraguay River, which flows into it, going up to the Xarayes – though its source seems to come from farther off.”<sup>108</sup>

From Lake Xarais, the border would follow “a line *west* for a distance of 100 leagues, *as may be seen on the map*, until the Madeira River, which mingles its current with the waters of the River of the Amazons.”<sup>109</sup> Which map was this, to which the ambassador referred so directly in the *Instruções* that there was no need to identify it? All signs seem to point to one of the manuscript versions of the *Carte de l’Amérique méridionale*. Not only was it one of the few maps of the period to give this configuration to the Brazilian Midwest – since Portuguese mapmakers had long since abandoned the depiction of the golden lake – but the dividing line it suggested was precisely the one indicated by D. Luís. We know that these instructions were initially written in 1736 but not sent immediately, undergoing successive revisions until the end of the ambassador’s life, in 1749.<sup>110</sup>

How were Portuguese frontiers in America configured in D’Anville’s cartography before taking form in the 1748 *Carte de l’Amérique méridionale*, and in its

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<sup>106</sup> CORTESÃO, Jaime. *Alexandre de Gusmão e o Tratado de Madrid*, 1984, v.III, note 5, p.787 and vol.IV, note 5, p.908. However, Cortesão makes mistakes in dating D’Anville’s printed maps, which can be explained by the continuity of the same date on all versions. Indeed, the version presenting the source of the Paraguay at 5 or 6 degrees of latitude is later than the version placing it near 12° and closer to its real position, though Cortesão states the opposite.

<sup>107</sup> D’Anville. *Carte de l’Amérique méridionale* de d’Anville, 1748 manuscript. BNF. DCP. Ge C 11339 (rés) and BNF. DCP. CeC 6149. The manuscript version shows pencil sketches of future corrections, introduced by D’Anville in subsequent versions.

<sup>108</sup> CUNHA, D. Luís da. Carta de Instruções a Marco Antônio de Azevedo Coutinho, p.370.

<sup>109</sup> CUNHA, D. Luís da. Carta de Instruções a Marco Antônio de Azevedo Coutinho, p.370. (italics mine)

<sup>110</sup> SILVA, Abílio Diniz. Introdução. In: CUNHA, D. Luís da. *Instruções políticas*. (Ed. Abílio Diniz Silva), p137-145.

later revisions? To what extent did these configurations correspond to the geopolitical vision that D. Luís came to formulate for America? To answer these questions, one must juxtapose the shapes that Brazil takes on in various versions of the *Carte de l'Amérique méridionale*, as well as the various maps presented by the Portuguese at the negotiating table in Madrid; only thus will we understand how the differing geopolitical conceptions of D. Luís da Cunha and Alexandre de Gusmão were reflected in differing cartographies.

Though D. Luís da Cunha sent D'Anville's maps to Madrid and to Portugal in the hopes that they would be used in negotiations, officials back home finally decided to produce a "general map (...) which will be sufficient to show everything" being claimed.<sup>111</sup> Entitled *Mapa dos confins do Brazil com as terras da Coroa de Espanha na América Meridional* (Map of the Boundaries of Brazil with the lands of the Crown of Spain in Meridional America), it came to be known as the *Mapa das Cortes* (Map of the Courts), as it ultimately served "to settle the Treaty of boundaries in Meridional America, signed [by the two courts] on the 13<sup>th</sup> of January of 1750."<sup>112</sup> The two maps were based on two very different geopolitical conceptions, as we shall see later.

### The Río de la Plata Basin

It is clear that the borders D'Anville traced over the course of his cartographical works representing America varied over time. Let us begin with the Río de la Plata Basin, and the maps used to configure the area. D'Anville had samples of both Portuguese and Spanish cartography – not counting, of course, the maps produced by the Jesuits. He had a total of twelve maps of the Río de la Plata Basin and the mouth of the Paraguay. Excluding two of his own and one by Bellini, which was produced after 1748 and based off his own map, he had nine maps of the region. D'Anville also had memoirs and reports from missionaries in the region, which he had used to put together his map *Le Paraguay*.<sup>113</sup>

It is striking to observe the way in which D'Anville represents the region of the Río de la Plata Basin across his maps, in which a political slant is evident, and how he makes use of this base cartography to configure his own maps. The representation will change over time, albeit constantly reflecting those which D. Luís da Cunha believed to be Portuguese interests. His first map of the region, produced for the Jesuits and entitled *Le Paraguay*, appeared in the 1733 *Lettres édifiantes*. Here D'Anville established no line of demarcation, extending the Brazilian territory all the way to the northern bank of the Río de la Plata, including the Colônia do Sacramento. He justified this in the memoir on the subject by writing, "the sea-coast is uncontested Brazilian land until the Río de la Plata, where the Portuguese have the Colônia do Sacramento, near the small islands of São Gabriel." Given the "continuation of Brazil" all the way to the river's

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<sup>111</sup> ANTT. MNE. Book 826. Letter from Marco Antônio de Azevedo to Vila Nova de Cerveira, f.114v, Lisbon, December 28, 1748.

<sup>112</sup> BNRJ. ARC.030,01,009. *Mapa dos confins do Brazil com as terras da Coroa de Espanha na América Meridional*. No anno de 1749, reverse.

<sup>113</sup> ANVILLE, Jean-Baptiste Bourguignon d'. Observations géographiques sur la carte du Paraguai. In: *Lettres édifiantes et curieuses, écrites des missions étrangères*. [1733] Toulouse: Noel-Etienne Sens/Auguste Gaude, 1810-1811, v.8, p.254-266.

northern bank, D’Anville drew no borders around this area.<sup>114</sup> However, despite the absence of a line, the mouth of the Río de la Plata and its confluence with the Paraná and the Paraguay, all the way to Lake Xarais – and above the lake, a small river slightly to the east – configured a natural frontier for the territory, separating the possessions of Spain and Portugal. This map appeared quite in tune with the arguments of the Portuguese at the time, as they “believe that they are entitled to all the coast running from the district of São Vicente to the banks of the Río de la Plata.”<sup>115</sup> The Spanish vision, for its part, was radically opposed, with its negotiators arguing that “the Consejo de Indias has seemingly incontrovertible evidence that the extension of the demarcation of the Portuguese coasts from north to south is not more than 370 leagues, which ends effectively at the end of said district and falls over what the Spanish call in their titles Agua de Peruega, and the Río de la Plata is two hundred and twenty-five leagues farther.”<sup>116</sup> The *Carte manuscrite de l’embouchure de rio da Prata*, produced during the negotiations in the 1740s and found in the D’Anville collection, shows this difference clearly with two lines in different colors: yellow to mark Portuguese claims, red for the Spanish.

Though around this period this configuration of Brazil – stretching without borders to the northern bank of the Río de la Plata – was no longer what D’Anville was representing on his maps, nor what D. Luís da Cunha supported, this map of *Le Paraguay* was the one presented by the Portuguese at the start of negotiations in Madrid. The strategy suited Portugal’s needs well, as it presented the territory as a tabula rasa (in the absence of a clear marking of borders), obviating the lengthy disputes between the two Crowns since the creation of the Colônia in 1680. The map had been opted for in 1747, when Vila Nova de Cerveira was scouting out “maps of Meridional America to examine where the Spanish limit our discoveries in Brazil, according to their own maps.” Among those to fall into his hands was one made “by the fathers of the Company in Paraguay,” which Cerveira judged fitting. Unable to acquire a copy of the map in Madrid, he wrote “to D. Luís da Cunha to have him seek one out in Paris.” As was his habit, D. Luís went directly to the source. D’Anville “took it upon himself to copy the map, which had been corrected in the year 1732.”<sup>117</sup> The next year, Marco Antônio de Azevedo, in listing the maps Cerveira might show the Spanish negotiators, also supported using this map. Finally, on March 26, 1749, at the first meeting with Spanish minister José de Carvajal, Cerveira began the talks “displaying the map made by the Jesuits of Paraguay and corrected by Mr. D’Anville in the year 1732.” The Spanish minister, however, “preferred a copy printed on taffeta, so as to mark the borders with silk threads.” Cerveira accepted the measure, though he thought that the easiest thing would be to use a red pencil on a paper map.<sup>118</sup>

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<sup>114</sup> ANVILLE, Jean-Baptiste Bourguignon d’. *Observations géographiques sur la carte du Paraguai*, v.8, p.265.

<sup>115</sup> ANTT. MNE. Box 926. Treaties, acts, conventions, and other papers regarding the Peace of Utrecht. Letter from D. Luís da Cunha to Diogo de Mendonça Corte Real, f.99, November 30, 1714, f.104.

<sup>116</sup> ANTT. MNE. Box 926. Treaties, acts, conventions, and other papers regarding the Peace of Utrecht. Letter from D. Luís da Cunha to Diogo de Mendonça Corte Real, f.99, November 30, 1714, f.99. (*italics his*)

<sup>117</sup> ANTT. MNE. Book 826, Letter from Vila Nova de Cerveira to Marco Antônio de Azevedo, f.16-16v, Madrid, August 17, 1747.

<sup>118</sup> Letter from April 2, 1749. Apud: CORTESÃO, Jaime. *Alexandre de Gusmão e o Tratado de Madrid*, part IV, tome I, p.279.

In his *Carte de l'Amérique méridionale*, made in 1737 for the Duke of Chartres to study, D'Anville had already shifted the border of the region – since 1734, after all, he had begun to argue for the need to alter the shape of Paraguay. He declared it would be necessary to extend the Brazilian territory up to the Portuguese possession on the northern bank of the Río de la Plata, the Colônia do Sacramento, but with an interruption in the Montevideo region where the Spanish had settled.<sup>119</sup> We see that on the 1737 map, in the Brazilian South, the border corresponds precisely to this new perception of the geopolitical situation. The line, perpendicular to the coast and not too far from it, falls roughly along where the Tordesillas Meridian would pass. Brazilian lands are thus extended to the mouth of the Río de la Plata, but they do not take in the whole of the northern bank. Indeed, the Portuguese territory assumes the final form of a fork, or an inverted Y. One of the ends corresponds to the Colônia do Sacramento and the other to the point at Castilhos or Maldonado. Between them would fall Montevideo, a possession secured and fortified since 1736. The dividing line does not follow the Paraguay River, nor does it use Lake Xarais as a natural element to divide the terrain; thus this cannot have been the map D. Luís had on hand and which he referenced in his *Instruções Políticas*. In the 1737 map, D'Anville draws Paraguay as an autonomous province, lying between Portuguese possessions to the east and the Paraguay River to the west, in a territory mainly occupied by the Jesuit missions.

The 1737 map was a precise reflection of the political context of the region at the time. Most of all, it reflected D. Luís' interest in showing the French authorities how the territories of both nations in the area were mutually hampered and fostered an explosive situation. The continuation of the Brazilian territory, apparently more or less hugging the Tordesillas Meridian, made the Spanish presence in Montevideo an uncomfortable intrusion on Portuguese claims. The image on the map clearly legitimated the Colônia do Sacramento to the inquisitive eye of the French, whom the ambassador was trying to convince to mediate the negotiations. It is quite likely that the map was drawn up alongside the dissertation that D'Anville turned out in 1737 on the Tordesillas Meridian, revealing Portuguese interests along the lines supported by D. Luís da Cunha. The closeness between the borders proposed by D'Anville in the dissertation and in this map, when combined with the coincidence in the dates, is enough to safely establish a relationship between the two. The other version of this map, perhaps from 1742, and with no dedication to the Prince of Orléans, shows the same dividing line; it cannot therefore be the same one that D. Luís sent to Madrid, as it no longer reflected his geopolitical vision for Brazil's borders by the mid-18<sup>th</sup> century.

Beyond a shadow of a doubt, the 1748 version of the *Carte de l'Amérique méridionale* is the most polished presentation of the vision that D. Luís upheld for border negotiations with Spain around the end of the decade. Here, the Colônia do Sacramento is no longer connected to Brazil, appearing as a Portuguese enclave on the banks of the Río de la Plata. This presentation of the Colônia as an isolated portion was more visually helpful in convincing both sides of the advantages of a possible territorial swap, as he encouraged. One had only to glance at the map to conclude that this would be in the interest of the Spanish as well, freeing them from the isolated, inconvenient Portuguese presence in the river delta. Though small, the territory had grave political and economic weight. Not only did Luso-Brazilian merchants drain Peruvian silver through it, but the Colônia had also been a source of constant tension between the two

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<sup>119</sup> NL. Lettre écrite au R.P. Du Halde, de la Compagnie de Jesus, par M. d'Anville, Geographe ord<sup>o</sup>. Du Roi, au sujet de la Carte du Paraguay, doc.549, f.4, March 21, 1734.

Crowns since its foundation in 1680. In freeing itself of the land, Spain could complete its hegemony over the northern bank of the Río de la Plata.

However, more than convincing Portugal's adversaries, this configuration would help convince the Portuguese themselves, for whom ceding the territory was not a moot point, that they were surrendering an insignificant territory in exchange for significant stretches of land in the Midwest and Amazonia. In fact, the trade of the Colônia – finally settled upon in Madrid – were the source of much contention in Portugal. Opponents of the idea, especially the Society of Jesus, launched a defamatory campaign against Alexandre de Gusmão and blamed him personally for the outcome. The criticisms were hardly justified; Gusmão had resisted the measure as long as he could, giving in only in the last moments of the negotiation. D. Luís, on the other hand, had defended the policy ferociously,<sup>120</sup> and the *Carte de l'Amérique méridionale* served as a visual contribution to diminish the impact of what was referred to in Portugal as the “handover” of the Colônia.

Generally speaking, the line drawn on this map along the southern portion of the territory guaranteed possession of a narrow strip of land along the coast in Rio Grande do Sul, colonized by Brigadier José da Silva Pais with the 1737 establishment of the fort of Jesus, Maria, e José, and the map supported the proposal “made in 1714, during the negotiations of the Treaty of Utrecht [...] that admitted the extension of Brazil solely to the mouth of the Río de la Plata, via a tongue of land ten leagues wide, starting at the district of São Paulo.”<sup>121</sup> From the southernmost Brazilian territory, at the lower portion of the Lagoa dos Patos, the line turns to the west and from there, using mountains and rivers as landmarks, plunges ever farther inland to the northwest until it hits the Paraguay River; from there it goes north, hugging the river until Lake Xarais. The 1754, 1760, and 1765 versions see no change in the basins of the Río de la Plata and the Paraguay, and only in 1779 does D’Anville add a northern part of the course of the Paraguay River at the upper portion of Lake Xarais, including two tributaries, the Supoaiva (?) and the Jauru (whose mouth had been used in the *Mapa das Cortes* as a border). This artifice allowed the dividing line, which had followed the Paraguay River for a small stretch along the lower part of the lake, to continue following the river as a natural frontier on the upper portion of the map.

### The Midwest and Amazonia

On all the versions of the map, starting at the Paraguay River, the line moves farther and farther to the northwest until it hits the Amazon between São Pedro and Nuestra Señora de Guadalupe. These two are precisely the last Portuguese and the first Spanish settlement established along the river. We see that, before hitting this point, the line passes through a territory that – with the exception of the Madeira River – is completely unknown. The course of the Madeira itself came from Ignacio dos Reys. It was at Couvay's house in 1729 that D’Anville had drawn three maps of the region, using the sketches and instructions of the priest.<sup>122</sup> Two presented details of the mouth

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<sup>120</sup> Letter from April 2, 1751. Apud: MONTEIRO, Nuno Gonçalo (ed.). *Meu pai e meu senhor muito do meu coração*, p.156-157.

<sup>121</sup> CORTESÃO, Jaime. *Alexandre de Gusmão e o Tratado de Madrid*, 1984, v.III, p.754.

<sup>122</sup> BNF. DCP. GeDD 2987 (9553). *Carte particuliere de l'entree du Para*, 1729, Ignacio dos Reys, 1729, ms, 36X46cm.

of the Madeira and a few tributaries, such as the Urubu, Uatuma,<sup>123</sup> and Abacaxi<sup>124</sup> Rivers, around which the priest's mission had been settled.<sup>125</sup> Using this information, D'Anville fixed the configuration of the river network around the mouth of the Madeira.

Without solid geographical information between Lake Xarais and the Amazon (the upper course of the Purus, in the absence of any information, is indicated by a dashed line), the dividing line is determined in this area by pure geometry. This way, a rising line moves increasingly farther to the northwest, cutting through the Madeira in an area with little geographical detail. Around this region, a text by the cartographer informs that 22 waterfalls break up the course of the river between Portuguese territory and the Spanish missions. This constitutes a natural element separating the dominions of the two Crowns, justifying the author's move to draw a line without a secure referent. Without known geographical elements, the line runs straight on without approaching rivers or mountains (which in other areas would be possible natural landmarks), until it hits the Amazon. This line certainly guaranteed Portuguese possession of the whole of the mining regions of the Midwest: Minas Gerais, Mato Grosso, and Goiás. This also meant "preserving the fluvial line of the monsoons, connecting [São Paulo] to Cuiabá and ultimately linking Mato Grosso to the territories of Amazonia."<sup>126</sup>

From the Amazon, a semi-artificial line curving to the east separates the Portuguese Jesuit missions from those of the Spanish, cutting perpendicularly through several rivers in the region. One must highlight the fact that, around this region, D'Anville represents the basins of the Rio Negro and the Solimões as connected, trusting Gumilla and Acuña and following La Condamine's lead, though the Frenchman never made it to the upper portion of the river.<sup>127</sup> The stretch around the Amucu was established using information from the Prussian traveler Horstman, and the later inclusion of Lake Parima was due, he reported, to unnamed Spanish sources. While the inclusion of Lake Amucu favored Portuguese interests, the inclusion of Parima in versions after 1760 strengthened Spanish claims in the region. In the Amazonian region, one can see the steady growth of the Portuguese territory as compared to the two simpler versions of the *Carte de l'Amérique méridionale* from 1737 and c.1742, which only take in the lower portion of the river. In the 1748 map, the frontier takes in almost the whole western part of the bay and the northern part of the plain around the river's course, stretching north to Dutch Guiana and west to the viceroyalty of Peru, far beyond the Tordesillas Meridian, which fell roughly across the river's mouth, near Marajó Island.

### Cabo do Norte and the Guianas

When it came to the Guianas, D'Anville made use of the measurements taken by Richer and La Condamine at the mouth of the Aprouak and the bay of Vicente Pinzón,

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<sup>123</sup> BNF. DCP. GeDD 2987 (9555). *Confluent de l'Amazone, de l'Urubu et du Uatuma*, 1729, Ignacio dos Reys, 1729, ms, 20,5X31,5cm.

<sup>124</sup> BNF. DCP. GeDD 2987 (9555). *Confluent de l'Amazone et du Madeira, confluent de l'Amazone et du Rio Abacaxis*, Ignacio dos Reys, 1729, ms, 19X23cm.

<sup>125</sup> ANVILLE, Jean-Baptiste Bourguignon d'. *Première Lettre de Monsieur d'Anville*, p.554.

<sup>126</sup> CORTESÃO, Jaime. *Alexandre de Gusmão e o Tratado de Madrid*, 1984, v.III, p.754.

<sup>127</sup> RBC. n.539 (2). *Second Mémoire concernant l'Amérique méridionale*, D'Anville, August 31, 1779, f.10.

respectively, determined using the Cayenne meridian.<sup>128</sup> This allowed him to establish a more accurate location for the border which, from this cape, runs more or less perpendicular until the region of Lake Amucu. One must mention that in general he seems to merge French and Portuguese interests here. Since the late 1720s, after all, French cartography had pushed for a distinction between the Oiapoque and Vicente Pinzón Rivers with an eye to reducing Portuguese territories around Cabo do Norte.<sup>129</sup>

Relying heavily on the observations of French travelers who visited the coast of the region – principally La Condamine, who, on his way from Belém to Cayenne, drew sketches as he went and took measurements of the places he passed – D’Anville maintained this stratagem. His *Carte manuscrite de la Guyane avec les Antilles jusqu’à la Martinique*, from 1745, shows a clear separation between the two rivers. The place chosen in the 1748 map for the dividing line is the river and bay of Vicente Pinzón. Though a cursory glance at the map seemed to confirm an exclusive expression of French interests, the Portuguese had in fact kept what was most important for them. This division gave Portuguese America all of its old forts, constructed along what it had considered to be its territory by rights; and, more importantly still, it guaranteed control over the estuary and the whole of the course of the Amazon, making it possible to ban foreign trade on the river. In this sense, the map reflected the culmination of a slow process of constructing Portuguese hegemony along the course of the Amazon, which D. Luís da Cunha had pressed for since Utrecht, and which was finally achieved with the 1750 Treaty of Madrid.<sup>130</sup>

It thus becomes evident that the representation of the Brazilian South, West, and North in D’Anville’s 1748 *Carte de l’Amérique méridionale*, and not in the 1737 and c.1742 versions, illustrated the ideas D. Luís da Cunha upheld for the configuration of the Brazilian territory around this period. To the south, from São Paulo onward, Brazil stretches out in a narrow strip of coastline along the Lagoa dos Patos and Lake Mirim, ending just before the mouth of the Río de la Plata – thus stopping before the Colônia do Sacramento and the Sete Povos das Missões, evidently positioned beyond the Tordesillas Meridian but still under Portuguese control. The map clearly outlines the possibilities for trading between these two territories. To the west, the borderline puts all of Minas Gerais, Mato Grosso, and Goiás in the Portuguese zone, guaranteeing control over the mineral heart of America and connecting it to Amazonia, as suggested by D. Luís da Cunha and other Enlightened Emboaba figures, who saw in the Brazilian mines “jewell of the old woman”. In the north, though much of this area was also positioned outside Tordesillas, the Portuguese had won total control over the Amazon and even many of its northern tributaries, extending their territory all the way to the border with the Guianas and the viceroyalty of Peru. In this way, the map was not merely the result of the process of revealing the continent’s geography, made possible by Europeans’ progressive inland push (as D’Anville would have it), but also brought to light the geopolitical plan that D. Luís da Cunha believed to be the most favorable to Portuguese interests in America. This was not, then, a neutral document, as Enlightenment thinkers believed, but one loaded with intentionality; though this did not

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<sup>128</sup> BNF. DCP. GeDD 2987 (9558). *Carte manuscrite de la Guyane avec les Antilles jusqu’à la Martinique*. 1745, Jean-Baptiste Bourguignon d’Anville. Ms; 75X62cm.

<sup>129</sup> GUEDES, Max Justo. Os limites territoriais do Brasil a norte e nordeste. In: ALBUQUERQUE, Luís de (ed). *Portugal no mundo*. Lisboa: Alfa, 1989, v.5, p.211.

<sup>130</sup> BNL. Reservados. Cod. 11209. Letters from D. Luís to Cardinal da Cunha – inquisitor-general, Utrecht, f.312, April 13, 1713.

mean distorting the territory in question, but rather configuring it in the most realist form possible.

### ***The Carte de l'Amérique méridionale versus the Mapa das Cortes***

In the year 1749, the months leading up to the Portuguese decision to cede the Colônia do Sacramento were marked by unprecedented tension. The Portuguese were insisting that the Spanish indicate an equivalent to be exchanged, and dug in their heels on the claim that their possession of the enclave was legitimate. In this context, any information leak could be extremely prejudicial. This was no longer a matter of simply choosing an equivalent in land that could be traded between the two nations. As D. Luís da Cunha himself had pointed out for years, the issue had taken on larger dimensions, implying the definition of a broad new line of demarcation among all the American territories and also dragging in the disputed regions in the South Sea – the Moluccas and the Philippines. This was a negotiation of global dimensions, and no precautions could be spared.

The negotiation was based on the invocation of treaties, authorities, and historical documents from the process of the colonization of America, including historic and contemporary maps that might be used to justify each side's claims. In case of territorial invasions, it was established that, in first place, the right of *uti possidetis*, in which “each would preserve what it had occupied,” and secondly, “that the line be preferentially guided by the most conspicuous and notable landmarks, large mountains or rivers.”<sup>131</sup>

Spanish and Portuguese then embarked on an episode without precedent in the long diplomatic battle over the definition of Brazil's borders. The 1750 treaty did not put an end to the disputes between the two nations; squabbles over borders in South America would continue throughout the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> centuries, going on through the post-independence period and involving the young American nations. However, the negotiation did represent a landmark in giving Portuguese America a very similar shape to that of modern-day Brazil. The agreement overrode the Treaty of Tordesillas; and, for the first time, instead of an imaginary line of demarcation, the treaty established limits using concrete experience, either through effective colonization or the natural borders of the land, though in several cases both were produced by human invention.

This dispute was a war of cartographical images.

Getting ahead of the Spanish, the Portuguese were able to elaborate a fundamental cartographical document, presented by the Viscount of Vila Nova de Cerveira. Known as the *Mapa das Cortes*,<sup>132</sup> this document reflected the stance that Portugal stuck to in terms of the format of both nations' territories in America. Since the Andes wound up forming a natural barrier to the Spanish inland push from the western coast, the vast *sertões* of the central highlands – though promised to Spain by the Treaty of Tordesillas – were more easily reached by Luso-Brazilian explorers. Through their clever use of the network of rivers in the region, the Portuguese wound up colonizing the Midwest; and as its explorers penetrated the interior, the Crown's geographical knowledge of these territories increased. This precedence, combined with Spain's

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<sup>131</sup> ANTT. MNE. Box 612, May 16, 1749.

<sup>132</sup> BNRJ. Cartografia. ARC.030,01,009. *Mapa dos confins do Brazil com as terras da Coroa de Espanha na América Medirional*. No anno de 1749.

relative ignorance of the true dimensions of the American interior, allowed Portugal to gain the upper hand in the negotiations and guarantee at Madrid that the line of demarcation was dictated by the *Mapa das Cortes*.

One final dimension of this study, however, takes in the geopolitical visions of Alexandre de Gusmão, the great architect of the Treaty of Madrid, and D. Luís da Cunha – the latter’s as expressed in the comparison between the *Mapa das Cortes* and D’Anville’s *Carte de l’Amérique méridionale*. The differences suggest that, though D. Luís’ political thought was largely followed through on by the negotiators, through Gusmão’s influence, the cartographical representation of the territory and the way the negotiations were carried out diverged. What were these differences? Why, in order to serve the ends that both men believed to be in the interest of the Portuguese monarchy, did the *Mapa das Cortes* distort the dimensions of America, while the *Carte de l’Amérique méridionale* sought to represent its true dimensions through a series of clear principles?

Since the first quarter of the 18<sup>th</sup> century, in large part due to the insistence of D. Luís da Cunha, the Portuguese government spared no effort in collecting a serious cartographical record of Brazil, looking to arm its ambassadors in European negotiations after the War of Spanish Succession. In 1719, the Conselho Ultramarino, the body governing Portuguese colonial policy, recommended that the government sponsor the production of maps of Brazil.<sup>133</sup> After nearly thirty years of local and regional geodesic surveys, using many reports and maps from frontiersmen, Gomes Freire de Andrade (then viceroy of Brazil), oversaw the 1746 production of the map entitled *Descrição do continente da América Meridional*. Executed in Brazil, this map consolidated all cartographical knowledge in and of the Brazilian territory, as well as Portugal’s position in relation to the South American continent; the document sketched a dividing line between the two nation’s possessions, although still respecting the borders imposed by the Treaty of Tordesillas. This map was then sent to Gusmão to serve as the basis for the maps to be drawn up during the negotiations.<sup>134</sup> From Lisbon, a copy was sent to Madrid.<sup>135</sup>

In December 1748, Cerveira received instructions about the maps he was permitted to display. Initially, the list included the map by Diogo Soares, for the Rio Grande do Sul region; D’Anville’s *Le Paraguay*, for the Río de la Plata Basin; and Gomes Freire’s for the Southeast, including Goiás and Mato Grosso. From there to the Amazon, he was instructed to use the *Carta das Missões dos Moxos*, which appeared in the twelfth tome of the *Lettres édifiantes*, and for the Amazon, the map by La Condamine and D’Anville. At the time, the Portuguese resigned themselves to using “the maps at hand, because if we were forced to wait for others currently being ordered in the same country the conclusion of the Treaty would be postponed indefinitely.”<sup>136</sup>

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<sup>133</sup> ALMEIDA, André Ferrand. *A formação do espaço brasileiro e o projecto do Novo Atlas da América Portuguesa*. Lisbon: Comissão Nacional para a Comemoração dos Descobrimentos Portugueses, 1991.

<sup>134</sup> *Descrição do continente da América Meridional que nos pertence...* Reproduced in COSTA, Antônio G. (org.), FURTADO, Júnia F., RENGGER, Friedrich E., SANTOS, Márcia Maria D. *Cartografia da conquista das minas*, p.161. This map belongs to the archive of the Biblioteca Guita e José Mindlin.

<sup>135</sup> ANTT. MNE. Book 826. Letter from Marco Antônio de Azevedo to Vila Nova de Cerveira, f.112v, Lisbon, December 14, 1748.

<sup>136</sup> ANTT. MNE. Book 826, f.112v-113. Letter from Marco Antônio de Azevedo to Vila Nova de Cerveira, Lisbon, December 14, 1748.

Despite this first order, on December 28<sup>th</sup>, the Crown instructed Cerveira that, “as for the map sent by Gomes Freire de Andrade, it would not be wise to present it as it stands.” The reason for this decision was that “the governor indicated the line that seemed best to him, and as he knew nothing of our position, the territory is much smaller than that which we should like to claim.”<sup>137</sup> The proposed border hewed fairly close to that of the 1737 *Carte de l’Amérique méridionale*, taking in a small part of Amazonia and generally following the Tordesillas Meridian. The orders dictated that, if it should be necessary “to make use of that map, on the way from São Paulo to Cuiabá, and to Mato Grosso (that being the part that it best presents), you shall have only that part copied, or the whole map with the exception of the future dividing line.” Cerveira was then warned that “the general map that I have promised you, and which will suffice to demonstrate everything, is not yet finished.”<sup>138</sup> Between December 14<sup>th</sup> and 28<sup>th</sup> of 1748, however, we see that the government abandoned the idea of presenting only fragments or copies of maps already in the ambassador’s hands and resolved to produce a new map with the dividing line it proposed to claim. Why did the Crown opt for this measure, when its man in Madrid already had an assortment of reasonably trustworthy maps to guide his diplomatic work?

In 1749, the new map was finally finished and sent to Spain. Drawn up under the supervision of Alexandre de Gusmão, the *Mapa das Cortes* would indeed become the key cartographical piece in establishing the borders of the Treaty of Madrid.<sup>139</sup> Nevertheless, and despite what the Portuguese authorities had affirmed, the differences between this document and Gomes Freire’s map were not limited to the matter of the dividing line. The *Mapa das Cortes* was marked by serious imprecisions:<sup>140</sup> “several important urban centers in the interior of Brazil were pushed to the east; the city of Cuiabá was moved east by nearly 5°, situating it much closer to the line of the Tordesillas Meridian, and the distance between the meridians of Belém and the Colônia do Sacramento was set at just 7° 20’.”<sup>141</sup> These and other shifts were the result of the map’s fixation on longitudes, although only latitudes were numbered on the document. With this stratagem, all of Portuguese America was shifted east, and “the extra-Tordesillas area of Brazil was [...] significantly diminished, which gave the impression of there being few territorial gains for the Portuguese to the west of this meridian.”<sup>142</sup>

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<sup>137</sup> ANTT. MNE. Book 826, f.114. Letter from Marco Antônio de Azevedo to Vila Nova de Cerveira, Lisbon, December 28, 1748.

<sup>138</sup> ANTT. MNE. Book 826, Letter from Marco Antônio de Azevedo to Vila Nova de Cerveira, f.114-114v, Lisbon, December 28, 1748.

<sup>139</sup> FERREIRA, Mario Clemente. *O Tratado de Madrid e o Brasil Meridional*. Lisbon: CNPCDP, 2001. COSTA, Antônio G., FURTADO, Júnia F., RENGER, Friedrich E., SANTOS, Márcia Maria D. *Cartografia das Minas Gerais: da Capitania à Província*. Belo Horizonte: UFMG, 2002, p.15.

<sup>140</sup> There has been heated debate over the intentionality of these shifts, or the lack thereof. Jaime Cortesão believes that they were intentional, as does Mário Clemente Ferreira. More recently, João Carlos Garcia has argued that there was no intentionality involved, the shifts being the consequence of the Jesuit cartographical tradition which served as the map’s foundation (*Luzes nos Trópicos Seminar*. São Paulo, USP, 2004). New information about the intentionality of these errors in: FERREIRA, Mário Clemente. *O Mapa das Cortes e o Tratado de Madrid: a cartografia ao serviço da diplomacia*, *Varia Historia*, v.23, n.37, p.51-69, 2007.

<sup>141</sup> COSTA, Antônio Gilberto (ed.), FURTADO, Júnia F., RENGER, Friedrich E., SANTOS, Márcia Maria D. *Cartografia da conquista das minas*. Lisbon: Kappa/ Belo Horizonte: UFMG, 2004. p.31.

<sup>142</sup> COSTA, Antônio Gilberto (ed.), FURTADO, Júnia F., RENGER, Friedrich E., SANTOS, Márcia Maria D. *Cartografia da conquista das minas*, p.30-31.

When the distortions of the map are corrected, positioning the various geographical features correctly in relation to the meridians, the territorial gains that the Portuguese had hoped to swindle out of the Spanish come to light.<sup>143</sup> Alexandre de Gusmão's geopolitical project, then, was based on a cartographical illusion – a deformed mirror of Portuguese America – “drawn more to deceive than to inform.”<sup>144</sup>

For its part, D'Anville's *Carte de l'Amérique méridionale*, which mirrored D. Luís da Cunha's geopolitical vision for the region, represented the Portuguese territory in terms much closer to those believed to be real, using information provided by the ambassador, La Condamine, and other scholars and travelers, and bringing them together via a method of geographical critique. This was what the ambassador had hoped: that a single accurate map could put an end to nearly a half-century of territorial disputes. Indeed, even with incomplete information on many areas, one does not see any shift to the east here.<sup>145</sup> This bears witness to the maxims that D. Luís believed should guide the negotiations: with accurate maps and no sleight of hand being played with geographical reality, the negotiations ought to follow what had been settled in previous treaties, respecting *uti possidetis* and the natural features of the terrain.

The discrepancies between the *Carte de l'Amérique méridionale* signal that the two men's geopolitical visions and the ways in which they envisioned conducting the negotiations differed considerably. The experienced ambassador saw it as a matter of presenting the territory with the greatest possible accuracy, sharing the information that the Portuguese had gathered with the Spanish, and attempting to resolve these conflicts diplomatically while making use of previous accords. In this sense, D'Anville's map was a faithful mirror of the Brazil that the Portuguese had just invented. Gusmão, meanwhile, saw a need to disguise the territory's true shape and conduct negotiations by taking advantage of the Spaniards' relative ignorance of significant portions of land, doing so in such a way that their adversaries would accept Portugal's claims.<sup>146</sup>

Paradoxically, the two maps opposed two old allies: Alexandre de Gusmão and D. Luís da Cunha. With the shared intention of serving the interests they understood to be those of the Portuguese government, each invented a new Brazil, but using different means: the *Mapa das Cortes* distorted its dimensions, while the *Carte de l'Amérique méridionale* sought to reestablish accurate spatiality in the interior of the American continent, even as many mythological conformations of the continent stubbornly remained. In terms of the Treaty of Madrid, Alexandre de Gusmão was victorious; despite D'Anville's later efforts to defend his territorial conformation of the continent, it was the *Mapa das Cortes* that served as the basis for the establishment of the treaty, and would come to be considered the map that had invented this new Brazil. But the treaty also stipulated that bilateral expeditions ought to establish stone markers to demarcate

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<sup>143</sup> See: Projeção nos meridianos do *Mapa das Cortes*. Apud: COSTA, Gilberto A. (ed.), FURTADO, Júnia F., RENGGER, Friedrich E., SANTOS, Márcia Maria D. *Cartografia da conquista das minas*, p.31. CINTRA, Jorge Pimentel and FURTADO, Júnia Ferreira. A *Carte de l'Amérique Méridionale* de Bourguignon D'Anville: eixo perspectivo de uma cartografia amazônica comparada. *Revista Brasileira de História*. [online], São Paulo, v.31, n.62, p.273-316, 2011.

<sup>144</sup> DYM, Jordana. “Mais calculado para enganar do que para informar”: os viajantes e o mapeamento da América Central (1821-1945). *Varia Historia*, Belo Horizonte, v.23, n.37, p.81-109, Jan./Jun. 2007.

<sup>145</sup> CINTRA, Jorge Pimentel and FURTADO, Júnia Ferreira. A *Carte de l'Amérique Méridionale* de Bourguignon D'Anville: eixo perspectivo de uma cartografia amazônica comparada..

<sup>146</sup> FERREIRA, Mario Clemente. *O Tratado de Madrid e o Brasil Meridional*, p.87.

these borders in America. When these groups began to take local measurements, the distortions of the *Mapa das Cortes* quickly became evident.

D’Anville’s 1748 *Carte de l’Amérique méridionale* was long considered a lost treasure. Its primacy and importance in the construction of the Brazilian territory, extending it out in a triangular shape far to the west of the Tordesillas Meridian, were forgotten. This was due to the fact that the map was intentionally hidden from the Spanish during negotiations, even though D. Luís da Cunha had sent a smaller copy to Cerveira. The *Mapa das Cortes* was chosen instead. Soon afterwards, even the quality of the *Carte de l’Amérique méridionale* would be called into question. In 1750, Francisco Tosi Colombina, a Genovese engineer hired by Portugal at the recommendation of D’Anville himself to take part in the border-establishing expedition in Brazil, would study the map at the orders of the Count of Arcos, then governor of Goiás, and conclude that “one cannot base oneself on this map of D’Anville’s [...] and as for the interior of America, which belongs to this Crown, it is quite wrong and cannot even serve to accurately divide its districts and bishoprics.”<sup>147</sup> Colombina, who had been in Brazil for nearly a year, traveling around some parts of Goiás, had knowledge of other districts by way of local geodesic surveying, especially the reports of the priest-mathematicians. Around this time, the Portuguese had fairly accurate longitude and latitude measurements, allowing Colombina to conduct a rigorous critique. Most of the divergences he points out in the *Carte de l’Amérique méridionale* are on the order of a degree of latitude or longitude – insignificant, especially given the dimensions of the map, the fact that it was a product of armchair geography, the fact that D’Anville had no information for many regions, and that, given the imprecision of instruments and methods of the period, the very measurements he was working with were imperfect. Strikingly, at many points on the Amazonian Basin the map was geometrically more accurate than La Condamine’s; and the latter had taken *in loco* latitude and longitude measurements at several places.

The continued negotiations between the two nations after the Treaty of Madrid (the Treaties of Pardo, 1761, and of San Ildefonso, 1777) seemed to provide an occasion for D’Anville to rise in defense of his *Carte de l’Amérique méridionale*; to this end, he wrote two new memoirs in 1779, in which, with a few variations, he clarified the sources he had used in drawing up the map and his profitable collaboration with D. Luís da Cunha.<sup>148</sup> However, this was not sufficient to turn the tide against the relative oblivion settling over the map. Interestingly enough, in all the border negotiations involving the Minister of Foreign Affairs in Brazil from the late 19<sup>th</sup> century to the early 20<sup>th</sup> century, D’Anville’s maps were invoked as documentary proof of Brazil’s right over the territories in dispute. In negotiations with Suriname in 1897, the Baron of Rio Branco affirmed that “D’Anville drew the frontiers of Dutch Guiana in accordance with official surveys from Holland.” He went on to affirm that the British government had

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<sup>147</sup> Examination of D’Anville’s Map of Meridional America (1748) by Tosi Colombina. Apud: CORTESÃO, Jaime. Apud: *Alexandre de Gusmão e o Tratado de Madrid*, part III, tome II, p.139-144. As the young Count of Assumar attests, it was D’Anville who, at the request and in the service of Portugal, suggested that the king hire Colombina. Letter from April 2, 1751. Apud: MONTEIRO, Nuno Gonçalo (ed.). *Meu pai e meu senhor muito do meu coração*, p.163.

<sup>148</sup> RBC. n.539 (1). Mémoire sur un accroissement considérable de connoissances locales en ce qui intéresse l’Amérique méridionale, August 1779 and RBC. n.539 (2). Second Mémoire concernant l’Amérique méridionale, August 31, 1779.

used the same map in its favor during negotiations with Venezuela, in 1896.<sup>149</sup> This stratagem went against the context in which the map had been produced. Having invented Brazil and serving neither Dutch nor Spanish aims, the *Carte de l'Amérique méridionale* was subsequently invoked by the diplomats of several countries as a historical document proving a previously assured right over one of the parts of the territories in question. That is to say, the fact that the map had preceded the space it was inventing had been forgotten; now it was used as proof that the borders drawn there already existed at the time.

This book hopes to ensure that the 1748 *Carte de l'Amérique méridionale* is no longer seen as a lost treasure. It brought together two great *savants* of its time: D. Luís da Cunha and Jean-Baptiste Bourguignon D'Anville. It was thanks to the two of them, as they fused politics, diplomacy, geography, and cartography and together produced a map revealing the borders the Portuguese desired for their American territories, that a continental Brazil was invented. This invention was configured as a future plan, first put into practice with the 1750 Treaty of Madrid. In this sense, while the Portuguese ambassador and the French geographer are considered oracles of Enlightenment geopolitics, the *Carte de l'Amérique méridionale* can be seen as a valuable oracle of the Brazilian territory, one of continental dimensions, which it helped to build.

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<sup>149</sup> RIO BRANCO, José Maria da Silva Paranhos Júnior (baron of). *Mémoire sur la Question des limites entre les États-Unis du Brésil et la Guyane Britannique*. S.l., se., 1897, p.2.