ECAS PRESENTATION "East African Institutions: Five Clusters of Risks"

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PART ONE: Introduction

For the past decade peace and security in East Africa have gained increasing focus internationally. The region has experienced armed conflicts, civil wars, rebellion, drought and famine. Yet, at the same time, there is an emerging ambition among a number of African states to handle security issues on the continent independently. Such ambitions have fostered a variety of military capacity building programmes supported by external donors. The research that we present today is part of a project aimed at exploring how Denmark up until now has sought to contribute to strengthening political and military security in East Africa.

One of the reasons why this becomes interesting from the perspective of this panel is that the East African Standby Force is one of the institutions in which Denmark has been engaged in various capacity building projects. The project also looked at IGAD and the EAC, but the focus of our presentation today will be on the EASF. More specifically, we will present some of the conclusions that we reached regarding the types of risks involved in this type of military capacity building.

Methodology

Just a few words about the type of research upon which our conclusions are based: We decided to give the project an institutional focus. The main reason for this was that Danish foreign policy seems increasingly to take a direction in which we can see a shift away from the traditional focus on bilateral engagement toward a more regional focus in which Danish projects of various kinds are anchored in – and some are initiated by – regional institutions.

Given this focus we then decided to visit the headquarters of each institution where we made a series of interviews. In addition to these interviews with representatives from the three institutions, we also visited and conducted interviews at Danish embassies, at ministerial level in Uganda (which is a member of all three institutions) and with a regional expert at Makerere University in Kampala.

In other words, the report has a somewhat narrow institutional focus which is then reflected in the methodological choices that we have made.

The East African Standby Force

The EASF – formerly known as EASBRIG – was established in February 2004. IGAD was initially mandated to coordinate and initiate the establishment of EASF. At first it seemed obvious to have IGAD serve as the initiating institution since IGAD is the regional institution which – in terms of members – covers the majority of states in East Africa. Yet, it nevertheless proved impossible to reach a permanent agreement on integrating EASBRIG/EASF into an IGAD structure.

Instead, the EASF is now based on a memorandum of understanding written to ensure the necessary legitimacy and balance between members of the EASF.

Presently, this construction, however, means that the EASF is not anchored within a regional economic community as initially intended. In an effort to compensate for this lack of institutional anchorage, ministers of defence as well as heads of the armed forces from the region meet regularly in EASF forums. The current practice is such that heads of state hold a summit every other year. However, EASF does not – as in the case of IGAD and EAC – have a permanent forum where foreign ministers meet regularly. Within the APSA, foreign ministers are commonly regarded as representing the highest institutional level; within the AU and REC, meetings at this level are

conducted on a regular basis. Currently, EASF does not have an institutionalised foreign minister level, and this absence implies two things.

One is that EASF cannot play the same political role in the region as can institutions like EAC and IGAD. Another thing is the aforementioned lack of clarity about EASF's answerability. Whereas many RECs in other regions in Africa have their own equivalent of a PSC that can negotiate when and how to deploy the Regional Standby Force (RSF) and serve as the political link to the AU, the EASF does not belong to a REC with a recognised PSC and consequently a mandate to deploy the EASF can only come from the AU or, alternatively, from a "coalition of the willing". The EASF can, of course, still be deployed as an RSF, but this would require a consensus decision by all member states.

That said, the structural problems of placing the EASF within an REC in East Africa should not overshadow the success that the EASF has gained as an RSF. The EASF has conducted exercises both at staff level and with troops. In addition to these results in the area of capacity building, it must also be stressed that EASF has proven capable of serving another important role, namely as a much needed forum where the heads of the national armed forces can meet, talk and negotiate on a regular basis. It was pointed out in interviews at the EASF that this function is essential in a region where the military and the political level are closely related in an environment characterised by mistrust.

Danish Engagement

Up until now, the Danish support for the EASF has mainly focused on the military part of EASF and involved providing military advisors, support for exercises and training and support for the RDC project in Rwanda. However, the EASF also has police and civilian components. The overall

idea of having these two components is that during and after the eruption of conflict, there is often a critical need for ensuring law and order as well as the rebuilding of key components of a society. Danish support of the civilian component has comprised funding for training and education, mainly at regional schools like the International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC) in Nairobi. By doing so Denmark has not only supported the training with EASF but also contributed to the regional training structure instead of using Danish training institutions. In the past few years, these police and civilian components have become an increasingly more integrated part of EASF which arguably reflects the great emphasis the AU places on the development of these police and civilian components and how this is now increasingly being institutionalised within ASF structures.

Furthermore, it has recently been decided to establish an early warning system within the EASF – a system that will ultimately exist alongside and parallel to the early warning systems that have already been developed within IGAD and within EAC. The EASF early warning system uses the same tools and software that are being used by the other regional early warning systems and, accordingly, it is questionable whether EASF's early warning system will be able to deliver any additional information. It could be argued that EASF, to some extent, is "copying" systems that already exist and duplicating efforts. From a Danish perspective, it therefore becomes important to ask whether Denmark should support the establishment of an early warning system within the framework of the EASF. If Denmark wants to support a regional warning system focusing on one of the existing systems in IGAD or EAC might produce better results than supporting the development of a competing early warning system. This would also enforce the approach that Denmark does not favour one regional institution over another.

To broaden the relevance of this point, we believe that one of the things which our research has illuminated is the relationship between regional security institutions in East Africa, including that, from the donor perspective, it is important to be aware of whether various projects anchored in

these institutions exist in synergy or whether there are competing efforts or even duplication of efforts.

In relation to the theme of this panel and the specific focus on EASF, we would argue that a broader perspective which relates the activities of EASF to the activities of other regional institutions have been tremendously fruitful in bringing out important insights such as this point about institutional synergies, competition or duplication of efforts.

Danish support and Friends of EASF

The success of the EASF depends on funding and support. The daily expenses generated by the Standby Force are covered by the member states. Donors, however, normally fund exercises or other activities conducted by the Standby Force. Denmark has contributed to the funding of such activities. Denmark has allocated 15 million DKK to support the development of the EASF from 2011-2014. This funding may be used for a variety of activities, including exercises, courses, training and support for staff officers deployed to the current African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). The support is coordinated within the group called Friends of EASF, which consists of a number of countries, including Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, the UK, the US and the Nordic countries. In addition to this, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Iceland and Norway have created the Nordic Advisory and Coordination Staff (NACS) in order to forge a Scandinavian approach to the EASF (MoD, November 2012). Denmark, Norway, and Finland have each taken a leading role, Denmark on the land component, Norway the maritime component, and Finland in the area of peace support courses and training.

Cooperation within NACS, however, still faces some important challenges as each nation continues to give donations to the EASF on a bilateral basis. As a result, NACS primarily serves as a coordination forum among the Nordic states. This coordination role has proven valuable in, for

example providing education, support and the ability to find joint solutions. When deciding on bigger multilateral projects, on the other hand, the different countries' regulations and decision processes often result prolonging the decision about what projects can be supported.

Military advice, strategic sealift, military education and the Kenya Navy

Since 2008 Denmark has had at least one military advisor at the EASF headquarters in Nairobi and since 2009 Denmark has provided support to the EASF during four major exercises, including the EASF's first major exercise, where Denmark provided the 1,500 participating soldiers with a strategic sealift to move equipment from Sudan and Kenya to Djibouti (Nielsen 2009). Most recently Denmark has supported the EASF with training in command and control of maritime forces during search and rescue operations.

Within the Global Framework Programme 2011-2014 Denmark has allocated 15 million DKK for capacity building in EASF and an additional 26 million DKK for the development of a rapid deployment capability (RDC) in Rwanda within the EASF framework. Furthermore Denmark has allocated 25 million DKK to the trust fund of the current AMISOM. Combined with other minor expenses, Denmark's support for regional stability and regional capacity building in East Africa from 2011-2014 amounts to approximately 70 million DKK. In addition to supporting the EASF and the RDC in Rwanda, the Global Framework Programme 2011-2014 also allocates 103 million DKK to counter piracy and promote the stabilisation of Somalia. This allocation is mainly used to fund projects within two areas: Support of the UN Governance, Security and Rule of Law Programme in Somalia (45 million DKK) and capacity building in the Kenyan and Djiboutian Navies (48 million DKK). The latter involves Danish defence forces and is the largest single sub-component programme in the Global Framework Programme for the Wider Horn of Africa/East Africa 2011-2014.

In December 2011 the Danish Ministry of Defence made an agreement with the Kenya Navy (Sørensen, 2011) that included three major programmes:

• Provision of technical support, equipment and training
• Donation of test equipment for ship engines
• Support for the development of coastal radar surveillance

The first programme has already been completed, while the second one is in its final stages and the third is still under negotiation. In addition Denmark has recently decided – in agreement with Kenyan authorities – to provide a maritime advisor to the Kenya Navy with the purpose of continuing a dialogue on future projects.

The second largest sub-component programme, namely the RDC in Rwanda, was initiated after Denmark and Rwanda signed a Memorandum of Understanding and Status of Forces Agreement in June 2012 with the purpose of having Denmark assist Rwanda in the development of RDC. The initial idea was to support the development of this RDC within the framework of a broad Nordic approach. Norway, Sweden and Finland, however, were not interested in supporting the Rwandan RDC project. Their scepticism was mainly due to Rwanda's past as well as Rwanda's unclear role in the current unrest in neighbouring DRC. Denmark thus ended up engaging in the project as the leading donor nation, though with political support from the UK and the US.

The aim of an RDC is to have a capability that allows the deployment of a battalion- size unit under EASF and the AU. The idea is that the EASF should have three RDCs available for rotation if the EASF were to be deployed for an extended period. With an RDC already established in Uganda and Kenya,4 Rwanda pledged to initiate the third RDC in the region and it was this, combined with a

Danish focus on East Africa, which resulted in Denmark deciding in June 2012 to support the Rwandan RDC project.

Only three months later, however, Denmark put the support on hold due to allegations (mainly from a UN report on the topic) that Rwanda was supporting the M23 rebels in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The purpose of this move was to send a political signal to the Rwandan government that Denmark did not approve of Rwanda's behaviour in the DRC. The suspension of support, however, was not simultaneously explained diplomatically to Rwanda, consequently leading to a misunderstanding and mistrust from the Rwandese toward the Danish project.

Challenges

Rapid Deployment Capability (RDC)

Whether a suspension of the capacity- building project in Rwanda was the right decision has been (and still is) disputed. Although the RDC project in Rwanda in a certain sense rested within a regional framework insofar as the RDC was part of the EASF, the difficulties surrounding the decision to suspend the project arguably illustrate some of the complexities and risks involved when making bilateral agreements. On the one hand, the political sensitivity surrounding the Rwandan RDC project was evident from the outset. One indication of this high level of political sensitivity is the fact that, apart from Denmark, no other Scandinavian country was willing to support this RDC project in Rwanda because of the high political risks involved. The Netherlands also declined to participate when approached by Denmark with an invitation to become a partner in the project. Denmark nevertheless decided to continue negotiations with Rwanda on the basis that establishing an RDC would be in line with the Danish African strategy. And although the original risk assessment of the RDC project was based on the assumption that the project would be carried out as

a joint Scandinavian venture, Denmark eventually decided to take on the leading role when it embarked on the project, sharing the political risk with the UK and the US.

In addition to risks stemming from the political sensitivity surrounding the project, another challenge (which seems to have been disregarded when deciding to place the RDC in Rwanda) is the fact that that Denmark does not have any diplomatic representation in Rwanda and Rwanda is not a priority country within Danish development cooperation. The absence of other Danish programmes in Rwanda meant that if/when the situation in Rwanda would change in ways that would contradict Danish values and interests, Denmark would neither have the option of suspending development aid nor the ability of having a close diplomatic dialogue as an alternative means of pressure.

These shortcomings soon haunt Denmark. At a time when the UK and the US had responded to allegations of Rwandan involvement in the conflict in the DRC by suspending or cutting funding for aid or other projects, Denmark decided to suspend its support for the RDC project as there seemed to be no other way in which to send a political signal to the international community and the Rwandan authorities. However, the decision to suspend the project may have important implications. First, if Denmark decides to continue with the RDC project in Rwanda (the project was suspended rather than terminated), this might not be accepted by Rwanda as key actors may well have felt insulted by the suspension of Danish support.

Second, there is a risk that Denmark's reaction to the situation could reduce Danish credibility as a reliable partner in the region more broadly simply because of a failure to use diplomacy to explain the suspension. In these ways, the Rwandan RDC project illustrates the need to not only make a thorough risk analysis, but also to assure that programmes are shared with other donors and that programmes have the necessary political support at all ministerial levels and include diplomatic

representation. The case of the RDC project in Rwanda illustrates that being the leading donor of a country-level project is perhaps more complicated if this is the only project that the donor runs in the country in question.

Had the RDC been based on a broad Scandinavian approach, there would have been a greater range of options for sending the desired political signal.

Kenya Navy

The single biggest project that Denmark runs is with the Kenya Navy. Supporting the Kenya Navy involves many of the same potential challenges as the RDC project in Rwanda in the sense that Denmark can never be completely sure how the Kenya Navy will choose to use the capabilities donated to it. Can Denmark, for example, be sure that the Kenya Navy will not compromise the human rights of suspected pirates captured at sea? The answer to this is no, but the difference is that Denmark is far more willing to take the political risks involved in this project and at the same time has tighter diplomatic connections.

Denmark has extradited pirates to the Kenyan authorities on different occasions and has for the past few years cooperated with Kenya on the issue of piracy. Put differently, Denmark prioritises, and is already involved in, anti-piracy efforts and consequently there is greater domestic political agreement that make running the potential risks involved in supporting capacity building of the Kenya Navy worthwhile.

PART TWO: ANALYSIS

There are certain limitations to a straightforward comparison of the three institutions described in this report. From a Danish perspective, a comparison is nevertheless still useful, since it remains important to provide information about the political risks involved in deciding to prioritise supporting one rather than another of these regional security institutions. As a result this analysis explores what we refer to as four clusters of risks, namely a risk of duplication, risks that emerge when institutions are used as tools to pursue national interests, a risk of non-intervention and risks that stem from a set of complex relationships. The analysis ends with a donor perspective on risk.

Four clusters of risks

Risk of duplication: Who does what and why?

What becomes clear from this comparison is that in the realm of training, the three institutions all appear to have very similar ambitions that might lead to a situation in which donors need to be highly alert to the risk of duplication of efforts. This could occur, for example if IGAD received funding to build a separate civilian training centre when this is an activity that the EASF also wants to carry out – indeed, a training centre of this kind already exists outside of but in cooperation with EASF.17 Funding-related decisions by donors thus come down to being cautious of this situation to avoid funding a programme likely to duplicate an existing effort within a different institution. Making such decisions might entail having to decide upon which institution is believed to be most appropriate for the given project.

Here, various arguments can be made. It could, for example, be said that IGAD should focus on the political level of mediating, negotiation and early warning as this is arguably where the institution

has its main comparative advantage and that it therefore might be more appropriate to have training activities placed within the framework of the EASF. Yet, on the other hand, one could also argue that there might be problems related to having training projects anchored in the EASF given that this institution does not have the same political foundation as IGAD (or any other REC). In short, duplication, comparative advantage and institutional structure are some of the key issues that donors need to consider when contemplating whether and how to support specific training programmes. This, on the other hand, also means that countries like Denmark could approach the region through a multilateral institutional approach.

As shown, IGAD, EAC and EASF are regional institutions that represent three different security perspectives. For Denmark all three institutions encompass opportunities for different projects that can potentially contribute to stabilising and increasing security in the region. The more challenging question is how Denmark can support these different institutions in ways that will not increase institutional competition in the region in counterproductive ways. Both IGAD and EAC would like to expand into additional security areas and this could potentially entail a degree of overlap and produce duplication as well as fierce competition for funding. Although traditionally focused on drought and development, IGAD has placed increasingly more focus on peace and security issues since the beginning of the millennium, especially in the areas of early warning and anti-terror. Within the framework of the EAC, its member states have conducted a number of combined military exercises. At the same time, both IGAD and EAC have similar security structures, although these elements are arguably more developed within IGAD than within EAC. To further complicate this, EASF also has a nascent early warning system.

One issue that makes EASF important is the fact that the institution covers all the states in the region, including members of IGAD and EAC. Therefore, if the development of IGAD and EAC unfolds in ways that add to a division of the region into north and south, then EASF will be the only

regional institution that can act as a bridge in matters concerning political and military security. In that role, the EASF can potentially become increasingly important as a forum where attempts are made to resolve disputes and conflicts before they break out. Insofar as EASF takes on such a role EASF could well be a preferred institution for Denmark to support in situations where Denmark would like to support military security projects in East Africa within a region-wide institutional framework, given that EASF is the only military security institution in the region which enjoys region-wide legitimacy and membership.

This does not mean Denmark should support every initiative within the EASF. For instance, the development of EASF's early warning system can be seen as a result of a military-level desire for the institution to have its own early warning system instead of having to rely on those of IGAD or EAC. However, it can also be perceived as producing competition between two political levels insofar as it represents a duplication of the early warning systems already in place in AU, IGAD and EAC. As the EASF's goals concerning an early warning system might also be viewed as an effort aimed at strengthening its political body, the early warning system is still a delicate matter as may turn into the political area in which the game of hegemony between Kenya and Ethiopia is played out. Accordingly, the EASF's lack of a solid political position might also be one of its strengths and a situation which might be challenged in the years to come.

Institutions as instruments for pursuing national interests

Institutions in East Africa might be used as 'tools' through which specific states pursue their own national security projects 'disguised' as regional security. This dynamic represents a risk in the sense that donors might then (implicitly) support the national security agenda of a specific country, which is different from supporting a move toward regional security.

IGAD: Ethiopia and Kenya

For IGAD, the prevalence of this risk has been a problem it has confronted since its inception. Today the most important dynamics concerning this problem of states using the institution as a tool through which to pursue national security interests are the role of Ethiopia and to a lesser degree perhaps also Kenya (and Uganda vis-à-vis Somalia). The dynamics of the border dispute between Ethiopia and Eritrea have, for example made it difficult for IGAD to act as a neutral mediator in this longstanding conflict (Healy 2011:107).

Similar asymmetrical patterns of influence have also been evident in the case of Sudan, where IGAD mediations broke down partly because IGAD's role as a neutral mediator was called into question in relation to the influence of Ethiopia. Similarly, concerning the situation in Somalia, even IGAD staff admits that they doubt that IGAD is the right institution to resolve this conflict given Ethiopia's major impact combined with its interest in a specific outcome.

Therefore, when supporting and strengthening military capacity in East Africa through the framework of IGAD, it is important to be aware of and make arrangements to avoid the potential risk that such capacity might be used to pursue the national interests of dominant states in the institution rather than to pursue genuinely regional security projects.

Therefore the Danish approach towards IGAD that favours supporting projects that include all member states seems to be a sensible approach. Insofar that the Danish focus on the peace and security aspects of IGAD might increase in the years to come, a multilateral approach would only gain even greater resonance. Pushing IGAD to interact more with, for example EASF and its early warning system could be one of many possible approaches.

EAC: Kenya, Rwanda and Uganda

This risk might also become a problem for them. Kenya could, for example have an interest in trying to use the EAC as a driver for national purposes. Moreover, both Uganda and Rwanda could push forward to make EAC a political union and both heads of state see themselves as future presidents of such a union. It can therefore be questioned whether Uganda and Rwanda seek such a political union for the common good or more as an individual or national ambition. Regardless of how the high the level of ambition toward the EAC is in Kenya, Uganda and Rwanda, it is questionable whether this will contribute to lessening the Tanzanian scepticism and mistrust towards the vision these countries have for the EAC. Recognising that Denmark cannot change this situation, it might nevertheless still be possible for Denmark to emphasise a more multilateral approach when engaging with these states because this type of approach could potentially foster a greater sense of coherence among states in the region, and thereby indirectly reduce the existing level of scepticism.

EASF: Rapid deployment capability (RDC) and military capacity building

For the EASF, the risk of the national interests of member states having a counterproductive effect on institutional developments might also become a problem. For the EASF to be able to act, the existence of components such as military capabilities is necessary. As a result the construction of three RDCs in the region seems to make good sense, especially when the purpose is to be able to prevent e.g. genocide and war crimes on short notice. This is the main reason why Denmark decided to support the RDC project in Rwanda. However, the RDC in Rwanda is almost solely made up of Rwandese soldiers as opposed to being comprised of soldiers from various states in the region. In an institutional context, the RDC might thus be regional, yet in content it remains national.

This point has also been made in a 2010 report (COWI 2010), which presented a risk analysis of the RDC project in Rwanda on behalf of the Ministry of Defence. This does not simply mean that military capacity building is a bad idea. Rather it seems to suggest that the political risks involved in such projects must reflect the political will and strategic ends of the donor state, in this case Denmark. Support for the Kenya Navy is based on a high level of political will to counter piracy in the Indian Ocean. There is a connection between this support and related anti-piracy initiatives. Although that project also entails political risks, an important difference is that the political will to sustain and develop it is considerably higher and therefore better matches the risks involved.

It must be said that in the context of our report and this presentation, risk is understood as the probability that a certain event will happen.

That said, the support for the Kenya Navy stands somewhat in contrast to the decision to back the Rwandan RDC. There was clearly a considerable political risk involved in supporting the RDC in Rwanda. The challenge of finding co-donors is in itself illustrative of this risk. What is more, the political will behind the project was not as clear as for other projects, an aspect that also partially contributed to the decision to suspend the project. It thus seems fair to suggest that because military capacity building can have unintended effects, such projects must have a clear political aim to ensure a match between the political will and the level of risk involved. Whether to engage in such projects or not depends on the political will to run the risks involved, on the one hand, and the political will to contribute to security in the ways described, on the other. The connection between the risk and the will can be interpreted as a matter of how high the issue is being prioritised. The art of countering a risk in a given project is very much a question of reducing the probability of the event happening. Diminishing the likelihood of certain events occurring can involve diplomatic means, economic pressure and agreements or selecting a project which is of crucial importance for the receiving country.

Along with this, the political will can be increased through partnerships with other donors or by linking the project to other political undertakings. Crucially, given the nature of military capacity building there is a great need to address the issue of how such political risks can be managed. Only once this matter is given due attention and careful consideration, can it be advisable to regard military capacity building as representing an alternative to non-military capacity projects.

Risks of non-intervention in internal affairs

One of the tasks of regional institutions in East Africa is to prevent, manage and resolve violent conflict in the region. Yet, at the same time existing institutions are currently unable to act on potential issues of conflict when and where these are defined as the 'internal affairs' of one of their members. This situation represents a risk to external partners in the sense that it might limit the kinds of conflicts that regional institutions are able to act upon unless these conflicts are within the definition of genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes. Also, when it concerns 'small' states, this might also entail the risk of tilting the balance in favour of already strong states in the region, as they have a much larger degree of influence on what issues they wish to define as 'internal' affairs. This limitation represents a risk when the security situation in a region is so fragile that it could be destabilised as a result of 'internal affairs' that this type of regional engagement and capacity building is unable to act upon given the institutional limitations.

Complex relationships

The fact that there is no generally acknowledged hegemon in East Africa is 'good' in the sense that there is less of a risk that one member state will have the political and functional capacity to appropriate an institution to advance its national interests under an apparently legitimate facade.

This risk has, for example been referred to in the 2000 Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (also referred to as the Brahimi Report), which warned that a regional institution that is dominated by one of its members might serve as an impediment to short-term conflict prevention strategies. Yet, even if this risk is lower in a region with no single hegemon, this does not mean an absence of risks related to the delegation of power to regional bodies and the issue of hegemony. Rather it comes with a different set of complications in that the different regional security institutions in East Africa risk becoming the subject of competition between the different states using them to display their power and status in the region. This has produced complications in the case of EASF, which was first anchored within IGAD, but later this caused too much objection from states other than Ethiopia.

As an example, changing dynamics and relative power relations between Kenya and other states in the region might have a considerable impact on the regional institutional dynamics and might determine whether Kenya decides to put the most effort into its EAC membership or into its IGAD membership – or to act unilaterally (as was initially the case when Kenyan troops entered southern Somalia). Similar examples can be made with Ethiopia, Uganda and Rwanda. Foreseeing the direction of these dynamics is impossible, which is why they are important for external partners to follow closely.

Risk seen from a donor perspective: A whole-of-government approach as a risk-reduction strategy

All of these risks are on the part of the regional context, but risks also exist on the 'donor' end. From a Danish perspective an interesting point that this analysis brings out is an internal inconsistency regarding the logic of military projects. Rather than thinking of defence projects as solutions in and of themselves, the current policy is that a whole-of-government approach or

samtænkning in Danish, between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark and the Danish Ministry of Defence is a prerequisite for success. As described in the introductory section, a number of policy framework documents and initiatives have been developed to facilitate this kind of combined thinking between ministries. In an interview at the International Office of the Danish Ministry of Defence, it was pointed out that the whole-of-government approach is understood by metaphorically looking at policy as having two legs (humanitarian aid/development and defence/military) rather than one, and, as such, is more stable and more likely to succeed.

Specifically – and as already mentioned – this metaphor applies to the military capacity building project in Rwanda. On the one hand, the RDC project in Rwanda was understood as being two-legged with reference to its anchorage in the EASF framework and its regional character – a region in which Denmark has various development projects (the "other" leg). On the other hand, however, the Danish presence in Rwanda within the area of development aid is extremely limited and there is no diplomatic representation. Consequently, insofar as the military project had no national development counterpart, one could argue that, in an important sense, the RDC project effectively only had a military component (i.e. one rather than two legs).

Insofar as a whole-of-government approach is the political starting point for Danish military engagement in East Africa, the above seems to illustrate that it is necessary to pay careful attention to how this approach translates when implemented in specific projects. Notably, it seems important to avoid the emergence of contradictions as a result of diverse interpretations of whether or not a project is whole-of-government in a regional or in a national sense. Here it would seem insufficient to interpret a specific initiative as comprehensive and truly whole-of-government in its approach, if only one of the two aspects only exist at the regional level. That said, the idea of a whole-of-government approach is not without problems, and to say that it might provide some level of risk-

reduction to have both of the ministries involved in a regional security project is not to say that this in itself is the recipe for risk-free engagement.

One issue that needs attention within this "combined thinking" logic is the at times divergent understandings and different histories of international engagement that exist in the two ministries. The interviews carried out in Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Uganda and Tanzania made it clear that the two ministries differ culturally. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark largely has a tradition of thinking about development based on a bilateral approach, while the Danish Ministry of Defence chiefly has a tradition of considering defence projects from a more multilateral or institutional approach. In the context of Danish engagements in the region of East Africa, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs mainly work on a national level, while Ministry of Defence primarily works on an institutional level.

Without speaking in favour of the approach in one ministry as opposed to the other, the point is that a more streamlined approach would provide a stronger basis for a coherent Danish approach to engagements in East Africa, whether of a developmental or a military nature, or a combination of the two. One noticeable example of this is the approach taken in the case of Danish engagements in Kenya, where bilateral military capacity building is only one of many Danish programmes in the country, thus providing Denmark with a range of instruments that can be used to minimize the risk that the military capacity being developed will not be used for ends that contradict the aim of strengthening regional security and stability.